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"MCDUFFY IS DEAD; LONG LIVE
MCDUFFY!": FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
WITHOUT REMEDIES IN THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
ALAN JAY ROM*
"Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the
lower class of people, are so extremely wise and useful, that,
to a humane and generous mind, no expense for this purpose
would be thought extravagant," John Adams, 1776.1
INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORY OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Forming the foundation for American values and law, the
Declaration of Independence introduced the concept that certain
fundamental rights are derived from a higher power and that
government exists to ensure that these rights are delivered to
man.2  Embedded within the Declaration's premise is the
assumption that without government, "god-given" fundamental
rights would not be fully protected and recognized in society. 3
* Executive Director of Massachusetts Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, Inc. He
served as co-counsel to plaintiffs since 1982 in both McDuffy and Hancock. This article
would not have been possible were it not for the invaluable research, writing, and editing
of Pamela Verasco, a second year law student at New England School of Law. This article
is dedicated to the courage demonstrated by the dissents of Justices Greaney and Ireland
in Hancock and Judge Botsford for her unswerving dedication to the facts, to the years of
hard work of Michael D. Weisman, co-counsel in both McDuffy and Hancock, to Rebecca
McIntyre, Emiliano Mazlan, and Peter Montgomery, co-counsel in Hancock, and to the
Council for Fair School Finance, who helped make these cases possible.
1 JOHN ADAMS, Thoughts on Government, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 193, 199 (C.F.
Adams ed. 1851).
2 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
3 See Paolo Torzilli, Article, Reconciling The Sanctity of Human Life, The Declaration
of Independence, and the Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 214 (2000) ('The Constitution
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While this concept is certainly apparent in the underpinnings of
American jurisprudence - from the old town meeting to the
modern congressional legislature - the government's role in
protecting rights dates as far back as the ancient Greek and
Roman Empires. 4 Plato's notions regarding the balance of law
and man demonstrate that he shared the similar thoughts of our
forefathers with respect to the role of government. 5 "Laws are
partly formed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them
how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly
for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit
cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into
evil."6 Remaining true to notion that government must serve a
protective function, Charles de Montesquieu observed in the pre-
Revolutionary War era, "In the state of nature... all men are
born equal, but they cannot continue in this equality. Society
makes them lose it, and they recover it only by the protection of
the law."7
The theories of political philosophers through the ages teach
the concepts behind the origin of rights and laws. 8 In modern
practice, rights and laws exist in a broad spectrum of hierarchy
from municipal ordinances and agency regulation to common
law, legislative statutes, and of course, the constitutions of our
states and nation.9 Paired with each one of these various rights
within the legal system are their distinct counterparts - their
established a government system best suited to secure the rights embraced by the
Declaration of Independence.").
4 See Albert M. Rosenblatt, Fifty-Fifth Cardozo Memorial Lecture: The Law's
Evolution: Long Night's Journey Into Day, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2129 (2003) (noting
Greek writers explored "the nature of the universe" and laid the foundation for modern
rules of behavior and governance).
5 See id. at 2129-30 (discussing Plato's idea that justice is best achieved in an ideal
state or Republic and that "harmony exists when people live together in the polis under
precepts of universal and eternal justice").
6 PLATO, LAWS, Book IX 227 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., Prometheus Books 2000).
7 Charles de Montesquieu, 1 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book VIII, Ch. 3, 121 (Thomas
Nugent, LL.D., trans., G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. 1914).
8 See Thom Brooks, Does Philosophy Deserve a Place at the Supreme Court? 27
RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 1 (2003) (noting courts often use philosophers' theories as a "backdoor
method" for justifying judicial policy).
9 See Carl Bruch, Wole Coker & Chris VanArsdale, Constitutional Environmental
Law: Giving Force to Fundamental Principles in Africa, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 138-
39 (2001) (discussing civil law systems and the recent trend towards constitutionalism,
involving a hierarchy of laws beginning with the constitution, followed by statutes,
regulations, and custom).
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"bite," their remedy.' 0  Depending on the right infringed,
remedies take the form of legal or equitable relief.11 Sometimes
remedies afford monetary compensation, sometimes injunction or
other specific performance, and other times remedies exist in the
punitive form as prison sentences or even death.12 As William
Blackstone noted, "[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy .... whenever that right is invaded."13 Accordingly,
American legal rights, whatever the physical form, intuitively
follow with a remedy, designed to ensure that the justice
provided for in the right is effectuated and not left empty.14
Remedies thus mandate the involvement of the governing body
and require that these bodies ensure rights through their
application.15
This article tracks the history of certain legal rights, which
exist expressly or impliedly under both the U.S. Constitution and
the Massachusetts Constitution, and the remedies which give
these rights their "bite." It further establishes certain differences
between the Constitutions, concluding that the Massachusetts
Constitution is wholly more protective of individual rights than
its federal counterpart. This article posits that one right - the
fundamental right to education - as expressly provided under the
Massachusetts Constitution, has been permitted to exist without
a remedy, a jurisprudential choice which has not been supported
though all of history and thus leaves the fundamental right to
education empty in the Commonwealth.
10 See Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 530 (2004)
(suggesting rights and remedies be kept distinctly separate in legal analysis, fearing
tremendous harm to legal doctrine and individual rights enforcement if rights and
remedies are blended together).
11 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG & CAROL SANGER, CONTRACTS 452
(Robert C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 2001) (1965) (noting at common law, equitable
relief was discretionary and often withheld if "considerations of fairness or morality
dictated").
12 See id. (discussing equitable remedies at common law and their application when
damages awards were "adequate").
13 Id. at 531.
14 Id. at 530 (noting that a "foundational tenet" of our legal society is that courts
fashion remedies after finding that a right has been impeded).
15 Id. at 533 (demonstrating judicial remedies are one way governments may step in
to support a claim of right).
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I. EXPRESS AND IMPLIED RIGHTS UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
AND THEIR CORRESPONDING REMEDIES
"The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."16
There are rights so elemental to the American way of life, that
they are clearly written and enumerated in the text of the United
States Constitution. For example, the rights to freely speak,
print, and protect oneself with the force of a weapon,17 proved so
essential to the basic structure of the American government that
perhaps no Constitution would have been ratified without their
inclusion. 18 Following the proposal of the United States
Constitution to the several states in 1787, Anti-federalist leaders
urged the framers to include a Bill of Rights before the document
would be ratified. 19
On June 8, 1789, James Madison introduced the Bill of Rights
in the House of Representatives, effectively enumerating twelve
rights which the founders of the Constitution, as well as the
citizens of the United States, valued so greatly.2 0 Ten of the 12
original rights2' stand unchanged more than two centuries
later.22
A brief look at the rights and remedies expressly guaranteed
under the First through Eighth Amendments demonstrates the
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
17 See U.S. CONST. amend. I, II. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend
I. The Second Amendment states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend II.
18 See CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND
RECONSTRUCTION 5 (2nd ed. 2003).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Articles I and II of Madison's 1789 proposed Bill of Rights were never ratified. Art.
I pertained to calculation of House of Representative seats and Art. II involved
congressional compensation changes. While Article I was never added to the Constitution,
Article II was adopted in 1994 as the 271b Amendment to the Constitution. Bill of Rights:
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1164, 1171
(Chelsea House 1971); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
22 See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X (composing ten of the original twelve provisions
enumerated in the proposed Bill of Rights).
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varying types of liberties the Framers sought to preserve for the
American people and the means though which courts and
Congress chose to ensure they would be enforced. 23 The Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial24 was given remedial credence
by congressional statute. Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3162, charges
against a criminal defendant will be dismissed with or without
prejudice if the statutory and constitutional guarantees of the
right to a speedy trial are not satisfied.25 The right to freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment 26 is enforced through suits against individual prison
officials charged with constitutional violations.27 The Sixth and
Seventh Amendment rights to a trial by jury28 were paired with
the remedy that individual cases be heard and decided by jurors,
rather than a judge. 29 Further, the First Amendment, which
ensures the freedom of expression,30 is often accompanied by the
issuing of an injunction to protect the free expression of the
speaker. 31
23 See Dennis G. LaGory, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and Individual Liberties,
40 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (1987) (discussing preservation of liberty as the Framers'
"chief objective of government").
24 See U.S. CONST. amend VI (establishing right to a speedy trial).
25 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3162 (1975) (indicating ramifications of not satisfying right to a
speedy trial).
26 See U.S. CONST. amend VIII (establishing freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment); see generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (discussing how
Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" language should be examined in the
same manner as other expansive language in the Constitution is interpreted).
27 See Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (noting threat of
suits against United States was "insufficient" to deter unconstitutional acts of
individuals).
28 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309 (2004) (asserting that traditional
jury function is finding facts essential to the lawful imposition of a penalty).
29 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564
(1990) (quoting Seventh Amendment, "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.").
30 See McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 125 S. Ct.
2722, 2742 (2005) (noting government may not favor one religion over another, thus
enabling free expression of religious beliefs).
31 See id. at 2745 (highlighting Supreme Court's affirmation of Sixth Circuit's
preliminary injunction against governmental action that had a predominantly religious
purpose).
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Finally, the rights to bear arms32 and to be free from the
imposition of the federal government on certain land and
property rights were guaranteed by the Second, Third, and
Fourth Amendments, shielding individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures 33 and prohibiting the government from
occupying land to quarter soldiers without the property owner's
consent. 34 These rights also come with individualized remedies.
Most notably, Fourth Amendment violations are remedied in
court through the exclusionary rule, an evidentiary standard
which proscribes the use of evidence against defendants obtained
in violation of their Constitutional right to "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. ..35
While the rights expressly stated in the Constitution and their
respective judicial or statutory remedies form the basic
infrastructure of American justice, other rights not explicitly
stated in the Constitution but inferred from the text, form an
additional body of fundamental liberties. 36 Just like express
rights, these implied rights are often paired with particular
remedies specifically tailored to guarantee that the right is
effectuated. 37 These implied fundamental rights have been
32 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN.
L. REV. 461, 461-65 (1995). Reynolds analyzes the history, meaning, and interpretations
of the Second Amendment in the context of the debates surrounding the right to bear
arms and gun control. Id. It should be noted that it is not within the purview of this
article to discuss whether the Second Amendment refers to the "individual" right to bear
arms or whether this right is a "collective" right in the context of the prefatory language
"a well regulated militia."
33 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177,
187-88 (2004) ("The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is
determined by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate government interests.").
34 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.24 (1977) (referring to Fourth Amendment
right of the individual to be free in his/her private affairs from governmental surveillance
and intrusion).
35 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254 (1983) ("If letters and private documents
can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring that his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution."); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648
(1961) (stating that "this Court has held [the exclusionary rule] to be a clear, specific, and
constitutionally required-even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence
upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to 'a form of words"').
36 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (holding criminal
defendant has a fundamental right implied in Sixth Amendment to represent himself
during trial).
37 See id. at 815-19 (noting that state cannot constitutionally force a lawyer upon
defendant).
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described as fitting into six additional categories 38 including: (1)
freedom of association, (2) right to vote, (3) right to travel, (4)
right to fairness in the criminal process, (5) right to fairness in
individual claims against the government for deprivation of life,
liberty or property and (6) right to privacy. 39 Within these
categories, the Supreme Court has further cited and developed
specific fundamental entitlements, which are alleged to exist
between the lines of the Constitution and accordingly provided
their remedies. 40
The implicit right to freedom of association was established in
the 1958 Supreme Court case NAACP v. Alabama.41 In NAACP,
the court had to decide whether the State of Alabama could
require the NAACP to submit a list of names and addresses of
members residing in the state.42 The Court reasoned that a close
nexus existed between freedom of speech guaranteed under the
First Amendment and the non-enumerated right to freedom of
assembly.43 Based on an intertwined relationship between the
two rights, the court inferred a fundamental right to assemble
and applied a strict scrutiny test to hold that the state could not
compel the NAACP to report its members. 44 Even though the
words "right to assemble" are absent from the text of the First
Amendment, the court nonetheless created a remedy that
38 See Dr. G. Steven Neeley, The Constitutional Right to Suicide, the Quality of Life,
and the "Slippery Slope"." An Explicit Reply to Lingering Concerns, 28 AKRON L. REV. 53,
76 n.16 (1994) (defining implied fundamental rights as "those explicitly guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights or otherwise implied but not expressly articulated in the Constitution's
text").
39 See Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and
Judicial Review, 1993 BYU L. REV. 73, 82 (1993) (referring to right to appeal a criminal
conviction, right to travel and right to privacy as implied fundamental rights).
40 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (noting the word "travel" is not
found in Constitution's text but the right to travel from one state to another is
nonetheless firmly embedded in the Court's jurisprudence).
41 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment protects members
of NAACP when they pursue their lawful private interests and associate freely with
others).
42 See id. at 451 ('The question presented is whether Alabama, consistently with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, can compel petitioner to reveal to the
State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and
agents, without regard to their positions or functions-in the Association.").
43 See id. at 460 (noting nexus between freedom of speech and freedom of assembly).
44 See id. at 466 (delineating that Alabama failed to show a controlling justification
for the deterrent effect on enjoyment of the right to associate, a liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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shielded NAACP members from the reach of the state, allowing
them to remain anonymous. 45
Similar to the implicit fundamental right to assemble, the
Court has also inferred the fundamental rights to vote and
travel. The Court in Shapiro v. Thompson46 held that the right
to freely pass interstate was so fundamental to the function of
this country as to simply be understood, despite the absence of an
enumerated right from which to derive a right to travel. 47
Accordingly, the Court provided the remedy which mandated
statutes or other regulations bearing a "chilling effect" on
interstate travel to be modified or removed.48 Likewise, the Court
in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections49 found an implicit
right to vote in state elections by concluding: "While the right to
vote in federal elections is conferred by Article I, § 2, of the
Constitution the right to vote in state elections is nowhere
expressly mentioned. It is argued that the right to vote in state
elections is implicit, particularly by reason of the First
Amendment and that it may not constitutionally be conditioned
upon the payment of a tax or fee."50 The Harper Court, like the
Shapiro Court, struck down the adverse poll-tax statute, thus
fostering a remedy consistent with the historical role of the
courts since the advent of judicial review. 51
Another category of fundamental rights inferred under the
Constitution includes those rights that help to ensure fairness in
the criminal process. 52 Perhaps the most noteworthy Supreme
Court decision in this regard was the 1963 case Gideon v.
Wainwright.53 Wrestling with the issue of whether the right to
counsel, enumerated under the Sixth Amendment, compelled the
court to provide an attorney to criminal defendants who could not
afford to pay for one, the Court held:
45 See id. (ruling that NAACP does not have to comply with production order).
46 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
47 See id. at 630-31 (including right to travel as a fundamental right guaranteed
under the Constitution).
48 See id. at 623 (noting the court struck down one-year waiting period requirement).
49 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding Virginia poll-tax violated Equal Protection Clause and
the implicit right to vote in state elections).
50 Id. at 665.
51 See id. at 670 (asserting that "the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to
be so burdened or conditioned").
52 See Lee, supra note 39, at 82 (noting right to appeal a criminal conviction is neither
explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution).
53 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him.54
Drawing on American values, and more specifically, the
American criminal justice system's high premium on preserving
the adversarial process, the Court inferred that the right to
counsel, even for those who can not afford it, is fundamental
under the Constitution's guarantees and therefore must be
provided by the court.55 And, although the remedy required by
this decision might be difficult to implement, the Court was not
intimidated and did not negate the right.
The opinion came to an end without any mention of the
difficult problems of the scope of the decision: what
kinds of criminal cases it covered; if any apart from
felonies; at what stage of the proceeding counsel was
required; whether the decision applied to persons
already in prison, so that those who had not had counsel
must now be given new trials. All those questions were
presumably left to be answered when raised specifically
by later cases.5 6
The Gideon court's perseverance in requiring courts to
provided and pay for legal counsel to indigent defendants as a
remedy for the right to counsel remains arguably the most fair
and courageous action taken by the Court in giving "bite" to an
implied constitutional right.
The right to procedural Due Process in claims against the
government encompasses the next category of implied
fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution. 5 7 Codified
54 Id. at 344.
55 See id. (holding right to counsel is a fundamental right, even to those who cannot
afford an attorney).
56 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 189 (Vintage Books 1966).
57 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2812 (2005). 'The Due
Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] extends procedural protection to guard
2006]
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under the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the right mandates
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."5 8 The Amendment was
given full effect by the Court in the 1970s with landmark cases
Matthews v. Eldridge5 9 and Goldberg v. Kelly.6 0 Both cases
turned on the issue of how much "process" the government must
provide individuals before encroaching on other entitlements
such as property interests or substantive rights.61 Just like the
right to assemble and travel, Due Process became an implied
fundamental right, which required the courts to balance the
private interest that would be affected by the government action,
the risk that erroneous deprivation would occur given the
circumstances, and the government's functional interest in the
matter.62 With respect to the remedy for due process, the
Eldridge Court stated, "a person in jeopardy of serious loss
[must] (be given) notice of the case against him and an
opportunity to meet it."63
against unfair deprivation by state officials of substantive state-law property rights or
entitlements; the federal process protects the property created by state law." Id. The Fifth
Amendment's due process clause accomplishes the same end regarding federal actions.
What we call "due process" can be traced back to Chapter Thirty-Nine of Magna Carta.
Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 948. Chapter
Thirty-Nine in Magna Carta became Chapter Twenty-Nine in 1225. Id. at 958. It first
read, "[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled, or in any way
destroyed except by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." See FAITH
THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION,
1300-1629, 87 (1948). The phrase "due process of law" first appeared in a statutory
version of the 1225 reissue in 1354, "No man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall
be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to
death, without being brought in answer by due process of the law." 28 EDW. III, c. 3;
THOMPSON, supra, at 97 n.72. See generally A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (University of Virginia
Press 1968). Howard shows how this influenced the colonies and later the United States.
See generally Id.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (holding that discontinuance of social security disability
benefits without a hearing did not violate Due Process).
60 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970), superseded by statute, Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.S. § 601b (2005) (ruling that
discontinuance of welfare benefits without notice and a hearing violated Due Process).
61 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-71. Goldberg was the first case to hold that a
hearing was necessary to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process. Id. The case
involved terminating an individual welfare recipient's monthly stipends for failure to
meet program requirements without providing recipient an opportunity to contest the
charges. Id.
62 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (discussing factors derived from precedent that
must be considered in deciding due process issues).
63 See id. at 348 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
171-72 (1951)).
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Finally, the implied fundamental right to privacy as
established in Griswold v. Connecticut64 has proven the most
expansive, and perhaps the most controversial, of the rights
inferred by the Court as fundamental under the Constitution.
Justified as existing within a "penumbra" of enumerated rights
expressly contained in the Bill of Rights, or the opened-ended
tether of the Ninth Amendment, the right to privacy
encompasses more specific rights within its breadth such as the
right to inter-racial marriage, 65 the right to procreation, 66 the
right to raise children as one sees fit,67 and the right to choose
whether to have an abortion.68 The respective remedies of such
rights which trigger the broader category of "privacy" deal mainly
with the removal of government presence from certain areas of
private life, and the courts' role in policing the distance between
individual choices and government involvement. 69 Whatever the
means for ensuring the respective remedy specific to each subset
of the right to privacy, be it striking down an unconstitutional
statute or some other judicial or legislative action, the remedy
must always focus on the protection of the individual to ensure
the right to privacy is protected. 70
64 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (finding that Connecticut law prohibiting use of
contraceptives violated fundamental right to privacy).
65 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding Virginia statute banning
inter-racial marriage unconstitutional).
66 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding Oklahoma Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act in violation of fundamental right to procreate).
67 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (ruling that Oregon's
Compulsory Education Act "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
68 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (White, J., concurring) (finding that
right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy").
69 See Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as "Nonsubsidies": When Is
Deference Inappropriate?, 80 GEO. L.J. 131, 156-58 (1991) (discussing Supreme Court's
view on separation of public and private spheres).
70 See Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 85 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating Court's focus in
substantive due process inquiries involving privacy has been "on the significance and
intimacy of a personal decision to the individual").
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II. A MORE PROTECTIVE DOCUMENT: EXPRESS AND IMPLIED
RIGHTS UNDER THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION
We have recognized that our Constitution may more
extensively protect individual rights than the Federal
Constitution in widely different contexts. 71
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts can easily be regarded a
cornerstone of American democracy. 72 While the express and
implied protections offered within the bounds of the U.S.
Constitution have sustained the extensive fundamental rights of
the American people for nearly two and a quarter centuries, the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts stands its
elder 73 and arguably grants broader rights.74 It seems to follow
that the remedies paired with these more inclusive fundamental
rights in the Commonwealth should similarly remain more
inclusive and protective in their applications. 75
The Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Part the First) 76 within the
Massachusetts Constitution resembles its federal counterpart,
the Bill of Rights, in a number of ways. Protecting similar basic
rights - exercise of religion remedied (Art. II),77 freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures (Art. XIV),78 trial by jury
71 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 n.18 (Mass. 2003).
72 See S.B. Benjamin, The Significance of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 883 (1997) (positing Massachusetts' Constitution as "the source of the
Federal Constitution's political theory").
73 Id. at 884 (noting that Massachusetts' state constitution is "one of the oldest
written constitutions still in continuous use").
74 See Roderick L. Ireland, How We Do it in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has Interpreted its State Constitution to Address
Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 405, 410 (2004) (stating that
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court "concluded that Article 12 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights provided a broader protection against self-incrimination than the
Fifth Amendment").
75 See id. at 414-15 (arguing that even when similar principles are articulated by
both Massachusetts and Federal Constitution, they do not have to be similarly
interpreted).
76 See MASS. CONST., available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/const.htm (including text
of the Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
77 See MASS. CONST. art. II (stating "no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained,
in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience."); see also Soc'y of Jesus of New England
v. Commonwealth, 808 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Mass. 2004) (noting free exercise of religion"
protection in Massachusetts).
78 See MASS. CONST. art. XIV (stating "[elvery subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his
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(Art. XV), right not to impeach one's self (Art. XII),79 protection
against cruel and unusual punishment (Art. XXVI)80 - the
Massachusetts Constitution additionally includes such
enumerated rights as the right to assemble (Art. XIX)81 and
freedom from taxation without the consent of the people or their
representatives (Art. XXIII).82 The bulk of the implied rights for
which the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has focused its time
unearthing are subdivisions of an implicit right to privacy. Over
the years, the SJC has rendered Commonwealth residents the
right to decide whether to have a child,83 the right to decide how
to raise one's children,8 4 and the right to decide whether to accept
medical treatment.8 5
As one might assume, these rights come paired with various
remedial measures, just as in their federal versions.8 6 Such
remedies range from statutory remedy and individual causes of
action to injunction and evidentiary provision.8 7 Chapter V's
fundamental right to education is one right, however, that falls
outside of the natural right and remedy dichotomy. 88 Not only
possessions."); see also In re Jansen, 826 N.E.2d 186, 192 (Mass. 2005) (noting Article XIV
of Massachusetts' Declaration of Rights).
79 See MASS. CONST. art. XII (requiring no subject shall be held to "furnish evidence
against himself'); see also Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 200 (2005) (noting
Article XII).
80 See MASS. CONST. art. XXVI (stating that no magistrate or court of law shall "inflict
cruel or unusual punishments").
81 See MASS. CONST. art. XIX (recognizing the right to assemble in an orderly and
peaceable manner).
82 See MASS. CONST. art. XXIII ("No subsidy, charge, tax, impost, or duties, ought to
be established, fixed, laid, or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of
the people or their representatives in the legislature.").
83 See In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 723 n.ll (Mass. 1982) (ruling that Massachusetts
"has no interest in compelling the sterilization of its citizen for any purpose").
84 See In re Care and Prot. of Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993, 996 (Mass. 1990) (describing
conceiving and raising children as a basic human right).
85 See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986)
(recognizing that "[t]he right of a patient to refuse medical treatment arises both from the
common law and the unwritten and penumbral constitutional right to privacy.").
86 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995). It is not at all surprising that
Massachusetts differs slightly from the federal government in the extension of its
liberties, even though both sets of liberties arose from the same tenets of freedom. After
all, "state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord
greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States
Constitution." Id.
87 See generally Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 715 (noting guardian seeking an order permitting
tubal ligation).
88 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527 (Mass.
1993) (concluding that Framers of Massachusetts Constitution "conceived of education as
fundamentally related to the very existence of government").
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does this right remain absent from the express guarantees of the
U.S. Constitution, but the Supreme Court has also declined to
infer such a right.8 9 Once again, the explanation for this divide is
provided by the SJC itself-the constitution of the
Commonwealth is simply more protective of individual rights
than its federal successor. 90 Yet, the question remains as to why
this express fundamental right comes with no corresponding
remedy. More importantly, how did we even get here?
III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION UNDER THE
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION: "ALAS POOR MCDUFFY, WE
KNEW YOU"91
A. McDuffy and the Fundamental Right to Education
John Adams, author of the Massachusetts Constitution, valued
education. Part II, c. 5, § 2, in relevant part, reads:
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused
generally among the body of the people, being
necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties; and as these depend on spreading the
opportunities and advantages of education in the
various parts of the country, and among the different
orders of the people, it shall be the duties of
legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of
the Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of
literature and sciences, and all seminaries of them;
especially the university at Cambridge, public schools
and grammar schools in the towns;.... (emphasis
added)
McDuffy was originally filed directly in the SJC, sub nom.
Webby v. Dukakis,92 on behalf of the parents of children in
89 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding
education is neither explicitly nor implicitly protected by United States Constitution).
90 See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (2003)
(positing that "[tihe Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty
against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than does the Federal
Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ essentially the same language.").
91 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 5,
sc. 1. Hamlet beheld the skull of the King's former jester and uttered the famous, but
often misquoted words: "Alas, poor Yorick! I knew him, Horatio.... Id.
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sixteen property-poor cities and towns.93 Soon thereafter, the
Legislature devised a new finance scheme 94 and the plaintiffs
had to wait to see -its results. As the plaintiffs revived their
claims and started to prepare for trial, the Legislature enacted
yet another state aid formula 95 and the case was delayed by
order of the single justice of the SJC, who was overseeing the
case. 96 As the economy faltered and property-poor school districts
were bearing the brunt of cuts from the reduced state aid, the
plaintiffs filed a restated complaint in 1990.9 7
To this day, McDuffy is the only school finance case in the
nation in which the issue of liability was decided on a stipulated
record. There were "546 stipulations and six volumes of
documentary material."98 The parties agreed on the validity of
certain state reports, affidavits of educators (from within and
without the Massachusetts Department of Education and other
stipulations in order to establish a record for the Court's
review). 99 Some of the stipulations stated that, while the
Commonwealth did not agree as to the content of the opinions
asserted, they did constitute the opinion of the persons making
them.100 It took two and one-half years to develop this stipulated
record. 101
92 See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 518 (noting origin of case); see also Joseph B.
Harrington, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Cases Affecting Public
Education, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 171, 171 n.3 (1994) (discussing procedural history of the
case).
93 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 516 n.1
(Mass. 1993). The sixteen cities were Brockton, Belchertown, Berkley, Carver, Hanson,
Holyoke, Lawrence, Leicester, Lowell, Lynn, Rockland, Rowley, Salisbury, Springfield,
Whitman, and Winchendon. Id.
94 See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 70 § 32 (1978) (noting 1993 amendment).
95 See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 70A § 33 (1978) (noting it was repealed in 1993).
96 See Harrington, supra note 92, at 171 (discussing slow progression of the case).
97 Id. at 172. The plaintiffs argued that local public education was inadequate as a
result of insufficient funding via property tax revenues generated by the poorer
communities. See id. In addition, they claimed that the state aid provided was insufficient
to compensate for this lack of local funding. See id.
98 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 519.
99 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Mass.
1993) (explaining what parties agreed upon).
100 See id. at 519-21. The plaintiffs cited affidavits containing the opinions of various
education professionals, such as Harold Raynolds (former Commissioner of Education),
Peter Finn (Executive Director of the 'Massachusetts Association of School
Superintendents), Rosanne Bacon (former President of the Massachusetts Teachers
Association), and Robert Sperber (Professor of Education at Boston University). Id.
101 See id. at 518. The initial Stipulation of Facts was filed in October 1991 and a
supplemental Statement of Facts filed in November 1992, along with a six volume Joint
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The question the Court addressed in McDuffy was whether the
above quoted language "is merely hortatory, or aspirational, or
imposes instead, a constitutional duty on the Commonwealth to
ensure the education of its children in the public schools."102 The
Court concluded that the text was:
[T]o be interpreted in the sense most obvious to the
common intelligence. . . . "The words of a
constitutional provision are to be given their natural
and obvious sense according to common and approved
usage as the time of its adoption.'.. .103 [T]he
Constitution 'is to be is to be interpreted in the light of
the conditions under which it, and its several parts
were framed, the ends which it was designed to
accomplish, the benefits which it was expected to
confer, and the evils which it was hoped to
remedy.'1 04... Its words must be given a construction
adapted to carry into effect its purpose."105
Applying these standards of interpretation, the Court reasoned
that, "First, the protection of rights and liberties requires the
diffusion of wisdom, knowledge, and virtue throughout the
people. Second, means of diffusing these qualities and attributes
among the people is to spread the opportunities and advantages
of education throughout the Commonwealth." 106 In other words,
"an educated people is viewed as essential to the preservation of
the entire constitutional plan: a free, sovereign, constitutional
democratic State."107
To define what "duty" and "cherish" meant when the
Constitution was written, the Court looked to dictionaries in
existence at that time. "Duty" was defined as "that to which a
man is by any natural or legal obligation bound."l08 The word,
"cherish," meant 'to support' 'to nourish' or 'to nurture,"'109 and
Appendix. See id. The consolidated cases were reported by the Single Justice to the Full
Court in December 1992, argued on 2 February 1993 and decided on 15 June 1993. See id.
102 Id. at 519.
103 Id. at 523.
104 Id.
105 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 524 (Mass.
1993)
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 525.
109 Id.
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the Court cited numerous dictionaries having similar usages of
that term,110 and other texts, including Shakespeare.111 The
Court's examination of this important word included how John
Adams and other framers of the Constitution used it, for
example, in describing the importance of freedom of the press,
Adams said, "none of the means of information are more sacred,
or have been cherished with more tenderness and care by the
settlers of America, than the press."112
Thus, according to common usage in the late Eighteenth
Century:
A duty to cherish was an obligation to support or
nurture. Hence, the "duty... to cherish the interests of
literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of
them; especially... public schools and grammar
schools in the towns" is an obligation to support or
nurture these interests and institutions. The breath
of the meaning of these terms ("duty ... to cherish"),
together with the articulated ends for which this duty
is established, strongly support the plaintiffs'
argument that the "duty... to cherish.., the public
schools" encompasses the duty to provide an education
to the people of the Commonwealth. Part II, c.5, §2,
states plainly that the duty to "cherish" -support-
public schools arises out of the need to educate the
people of the Commonwealth; it is reasonable
therefore to understand the duty to "cherish" public
schools as a duty to ensure that the public schools
achieve their object and educate the people.113
It was also significant that the subject of education was put
directly in the Constitution.
The framers' decision to dedicate an entire chapter -
one of six - to the topic of education signals that it was
to them a central concern.. . .[R]ather than listing it as
a matter within the powers of the legislative or
executive branches indicates structurally what is said
110 Id. at 526, n.17. The Court noted that modern usage of "cherish" defines it as "to
have the highest regard for" and "to hold dear." Id.
111 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 563 (Mass.
1993) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE THIRD PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH 1170
(Howard Staunton ed., Gramercy Books 1998) (1998)).
112 Id. at 525.
113 Id. at 526.
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explicitly by words: that education is a 'duty' of
government, and not merely an object within the
power of government. 114
Moreover, inserting the provisions about education in "The
Frame of Government" - rather than in the Declaration of
Rights" - demonstrates that the framers conceived of education
as fundamentally related to the very existence of government.115
The next question the Court addressed was whether this duty
was mandatory or "hortatory," as the Attorney General
argued.116 The Court gave two reasons why the duty is
mandatory.117 First was the Eighteenth Century interpretation
of the words, "duty" and "cherish" as described above.118 The
second reason, the court explained, was a "double injunction:"
It not only sets forth the "duty"; it also, by the use of
the term "shall," mandates the duty: "it shall be the
duty of legislatures and magistrates".. . Third, the
duty is enjoined "for all future periods of this
Commonwealth." The unusual temporal reference
underscores the continuing nature of the obligation
and militates against a reading of "duty" as merely
advisory. Fourth, the Constitution does not use the
term "duty" lightly. None of the powers and
responsibilities of the three branches of government is
described or prescribed in the Constitution as a
"duty."119
Next, the court traced the history of public education in
Massachusetts back to the colonial days of the 1630s, leading up
to the drafting of Part II, c.5, §2 of the Massachusetts
Constitution, which John Adams principally wrote.120 Adams
believed that "widespread public education was integral to the
very existence of a republican government."121
114 Id. at 526-27.
115 Id. at 527(arguing Framers considered education a fundamental right).
116 See id. (arguing that Massachusetts Constitution requires government to provide
education).
117 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527 (Mass.
1993) (discussing reasons why providing education is a governmental duty).
118 Id. (noting Eighteenth Century meaning of the word "duty" was "obligation").
119 Id,
120 Id. at 529 (tracing history of public education).
121 Id. at 535.
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The Court traces Adams' many statements about the
importance of public education and why it was important for
"knowledge to be diffused generally through the whole body of
the people." 122 In a document prepared three years before the
drafting of the Massachusetts Constitution, Adams views about
widely dispersed public education are best summarized, "[L]aws
for the liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class of
people, are so extremely wise and useful, that, to a humane and
generous mind, no expense for this purpose would be thought
extravagant."123 In a subsequent writing, Adams said, "two
things are indispensably to be adhered to, - one is, some
regulation for securing forever an equitable choice of
representatives; another is, the education of youth, both in
literature and morals."12 4 In Defense of the Constitutions of
Government (1787), Adams wrote:
The instruction of the people, in every kind of
knowledge that can be of use to them in the practice of
their moral duties, as men, citizens, and Christians,
and of their political and civil duties, as members of
society and freemen, ought to be the care of the public,
and of all who have any share of the conduct of its
affairs, in a manner that never yet has been practiced
in any age or nation. The education here intended is
not merely that of the children of the rich and noble,
but of every rank and class of people, down to the
lowest and the poorest. It is not too much to say, that
schools for the education of all should be placed at
convenient distances, and be maintained at the public
expense. 125
This background was reflected in the writing of the
Massachusetts Constitution in 1780 and also in the first
legislative session after the Constitution was adopted, where the
needs of the public schools was addressed:
Nor can the schools throughout this Commonwealth
be permitted to continue under such inattention and
122 Id.
123 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 536 (Mass.
1993).
124 Id.
125 Id.
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discouragement as they have for many years suffered,
to the irreparable injury of the present and future
generation, and to the indelible disgrace of a free
government. We shall therefore hold ourselves obliged
to form' proper establishments for restoring them to
their primitive dignity and usefulness.126
The Commonwealth's first comprehensive school law was
enacted in 1789 and reiterated the constitutional mandate to
"provide for the education of youth,"127 and this duty was re-
affirmed over the years by those who had been involved in the
writing of the constitution. 128 For example, prior to the
enactment of the 1789 school law, then Governor John Hancock
stated:
That this Commonwealth...may increase its own
internal prosperity.., we ought to support and
encourage the means of Learning, and all Institutions
for the Education of the rising generation; an equal
distribution of Intelligence being as necessary to a free
Government, as Laws for an equal distribution of
property. 129
In 1793 Governor Hancock again asked the Legislature to
address the needs of the public schools:
Amongst the means by which our government has
been raised to its present height of prosperity, that of
education has been the most efficient; you will
therefore encourage and support our Colleges and
Academies; but more watchfully the Grammar and
other town schools. These offer equal advantages to
poor and rich; should the support of such Institutions
be neglected, the kind of education which a free
governmentrequires to maintain its force, would soon
be forgotten. 130
Other governors continued their support for public education.
Governor Samuel Adams, who succeeded Hancock, said "the
126 Id. at 537.
127 Id.
128 Id. (discussing framers' thoughts on governmental duty to provide education).
129 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 538 (Mass.
1993) (discussing framers' thoughts on governmental duty to provide education).
130 Id.
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security of the State depended on the education of youth; one
reason, among others, was that education 'qualif[ies] them
[youth] to discover any error, if there should be such, in the forms
and administration of Governments, and point out the method of
correcting them."'131 In 1801, Governor Caleb Strong addressed
the Legislature and spoke of the settlers who, "considered the
education of children, as the most essential duty, and the most
important exercise of government and provided for the
establishment of schools for the children of the poor as well of the
rich."132 Again, in 1819, Governor John Brooks, in a speech, said
"[S]hould the existing laws be found insufficient to provide for
the primary education of children, especially of destitute
orphans, and the education of the poor and necessitous,
prerequisite to their admission into grammar schools, the
deficiency has strong claims to the consideration of the
Legislature." 133
The 1789 law "required the towns to maintain schools in
proportion with the number of their inhabitants... [and]
prescribe[] penalties for neglect of the law."134 Case law
developed that supported the 1789 law. The SJC said, in a case
in which a town only maintained one grammar school in one of
its districts,
The schools required by the statute... are to be
maintained for the benefit of the whole town, as it is
the wise policy of the law to give all of the inhabitants
equal privileges, for the education of their children in
the public schools. Nor is it in the power of the
majority to deprive the minority of this privilege....
Every inhabitant of the town has a right to participate
in the benefits of both descriptions of schools; ... and it
is not competent for a town to establish a grammar
school for the benefit of one part of the town, to the
exclusion of the other; although the money raised for
the support of schools may be, in other respects, fairly
apportioned. 135
131 Id. at 539.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 540.
134 Id. at 541.
135 Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Dedham, 16 Mass. 141, 146 (1819).
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McDuffy recounts a history of laws enacted to cover a wide
variety of educational issues concerning public education
administration, raising funds for the support of the public
schools, textbooks, and, in. 1834, for the creation of a state fund to
aid the public schools. Then-Governor Davis stated that:
[t]he people of Massachusetts owed the early colonial
settlers "a debt of never ending gratitude for
establishing free schools to be maintained at public
expense,... The great wisdom evinced in thus boldly
striking out a course of public policy which required
the rich to aid in educating the poor, and which is
rapidly tending to revolutionize the world, has not
been wasted on their posterity, for free schools have
ever since been cherished and maintained as the
nurseries of virtue and liberty. So deeply imbued was
this attachment was the public mind when the
Constitution of the State was framed, that one of its
sections, in language of singular beauty, enjoins on
those who administer the government the duty of
promoting the diffusion of knowledge as the basis of
civil liberty. 136
In a prescient observation of current conditions, a Special
Commission on Education reported in 1919:
To the reader of this report who takes comfort in the
thought that his city or town is now taxing for
maintenance of schools all it can possibly afford, and
is on the whole doing pretty well by its
unfortunates... it would be a rather disconcerting
revelation to visit the poorer cities, the struggling
towns and sparsely settled rural sections of the State,
and see how large a number of boys and girls of the
Commonwealth are being denied the equal
opportunity for an education which Chapter V, section
II, of the Massachusetts Constitution guarantees. 137
The recommendations of this Special Commission included the
establishment of "a general school fund in the Commonwealth,
supported by income tax, which would be 'distributed to all cities
and towns so as to assist them in supporting education and
136 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 544 (Mass.
1993).
137 Id. at 545.
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equalizing educational opportunities."'138 The need was described
as follows:
[N]o state probably can show a greater diversity
among the towns and cities with respect to their
financial ability to maintain schools [than
Massachusetts], and no state can produce a social and
industrial situation that makes more necessary a high
level of general education throughout all
communities.... [i]n earlier days, when wealth was
more evenly distributed over the State, the system (of
local funding) was not seen at its worst. ... Now,
however, the need for 'equalizing educational
opportunity' across the towns was acute: While
Massachusetts has some of the best schools in the
country, she also has some of the poorest.'139
Anticipating that "dollars don't make a difference," the 1919
Special Commission opined that "[t]he excellence of schools
depends in large measure upon the amount of money spent upon
them."140
Chief Justice Liacos then discussed past cases where the Court
declared that Part II, c.5, §2's "duty" to provide education
authorized other decisions to be made. 141 This lengthy review of
constitutional history led the Court to conclude that the wording
of Part II, c.5, §2 is:
[N]ot merely aspirational or hortatory, but
obligatory.... [so that] the Commonwealth has a duty
to provide an education for all its children, rich and
poor, in every city and town of the Commonwealth at
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See id. at 545-46 (citing Nicholls v. Mayor & School Committee of Lynn, 7 N.E.2d
577 (Mass. 1937), requiring flag salute and pledge of allegiance). See generally Antell v.
Stokes, 191 N.E. 407 (Mass. 1934) (enforcing rule prohibiting public high school students
from participating in secret societies); Commonwealth v. Interstate Consol. St. Ry., 73
N.E. 530 (Mass. 1905) (justifying Legislature's passage of statute that required street
railway companies to transport public school students to and from school at half price);
Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen 500 (1866) ("accepting a grant of Federal lands to be used
for an agricultural college in the State"); Lynch v. Commissioner of Educ., 56 N.E.2d 896
(Mass. 1944) (holding Commonwealth is not required to provide free education in higher
institutions of learning, such as teachers' colleges, as it does in elementary and secondary
schools); Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94 (1869) (requiring legislature to "cherish" public
and grammar schools); Care & Protection of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987)
(highlighting State's interest in educating young citizens).
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
the public school level, and that this duty is designed
not only to serve the interests of the children, but,
more fundamentally, to prepare them to participate as
free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and
interests of a republican government. 142
Then the Court declared who owed the duty:
This duty lies squarely on the executive (magistrates)
and legislative (Legislatures) branches of this
Commonwealth. That local control and fiscal support
has been placed in greater or lesser measure through
our history on local governments does not dilute the
validity of this conclusion. While it is clearly within
the power of the Commonwealth to delegate some of
the implementation of the duty to local governments,
such power does not include the right to abdicate the
obligation imposed on magistrates and Legislatures
placed on them by the Constitution.143
The Court then turned to the question as to what this
constitutional duty meant and whether that mandate was
violated in light of the facts of this case. 144
As in most states, the Legislature of Massachusetts created a
state Board of Education and a state Department of Education
and empowered local communities, through school committees,
with the authority to run the local school district, subject to what
many would describe as a complex web of state laws and
regulations. 145 The laws and regulations covered all aspects of
education, such as administration, curriculum, transportation,
and financing.146 Federal funds constitute a small portion of any
community's finance scheme and are targeted for specific
programs. 147 Until McDuffy, and similar to the financing
schemes in many other states, the primary source of funding
142 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass.
1993).
143 Id. at 548.
144 See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 15, § 1E (2005) (stating that Board of Education was
created to support, serve, and plan general education in public schools); see also MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 15, § 1G (2005) (explaining role of advisory counsels to Board of
Education).
145 See generally McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d. at 548-49 (citing various laws of
Massachusetts as laid out in chapters of the general law code).
146 See id. at 549-50 (explaining responsibilities of the board).
147 See id. at 550 (explaining federal monies account for only four to five percent of
total expenditures, and thus are generally for specific programs).
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came from the localities' assessment of property taxes, but it
could not exceed the amount appropriated by the locality's
legislative body. 148 School committees prepare annual school
budgets, which are reviewed and possibly modified by its
respective city or town governing body. 149 It should be noted that
cities and towns have other competing interests, such as police
and fire departments, public works and health departments.150
The setting of property tax rates is a complex process,
involving state as well as local authorities. A tax-limiting
constitutional amendment, known as Proposition 2 "limits the
amount of local taxes which any city or town may assess in a
given fiscal year to two and one-half per cent of the full and fair
cash valuation of the real and personal property in such city or
town."151 To override this constitutional amendment, the voters
of the community must vote to by a two-thirds majority.152 The
Commissioner of Revenue then must determine the total limit on
local taxes for each community, but he may not approve tax rate
for any community that would "allow the amount of property
taxes levied to exceed the limit" on local taxes. 153
The secondary source of funding examined by the Court was
the state contribution.154 This formula is known as Chapter 70
funding. In Massachusetts, as in other states:
[T]he purpose of the financial assistance.., shall be to
promote the equalization of educational opportunity in
the public schools of the commonwealth, to reduce the
reliance upon the local property tax in financing public
schools, and to promote the equalization of the burden
of the cost of school support to the respective cities,
148 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 550 (Mass.
1993) (noting cities and towns are not required to provide more money for support of
public schools than is appropriated by vote of the legislative body).
149 Id. at 551 (stating school committees in each town prepare an annual budget
request for the schools, which local appropriating authority then votes on).
150 Id. (explaining that annual budget request is prepared alongside requests to
appropriate funds for municipal services such as police, fire, and public health areas).
151 Id. (quoting Mass. Teachers Ass'n v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 424 N.E.2d 469,
474 (Mass. 1981)).
152 See id. (noting that two-thirds vote is needed at general election to "override").
153 Id. (citing G.L. c. 59, § 21D).
154 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 551 (Mass.
1993) (stating state aid is second source of funds for public schools).
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towns, regional school districts, and independent
vocational schools.155
As the parties stipulated, since 1984, state aid to public schools
had not been determined according to the Chapter 70 formula,
but rather by the annual legislative budget process.156 This
process would likely result in lifting the cap on state aid, which
was generated by the formula, and entering a different amount,
which was determined by the legislative appropriations
process. 157 Shortly before the case was to go to trial in the mid-
1980s, the Legislature enacted an "Additional Assistance"
formula that was designed to be an "equal educational
opportunity grant program" that would "accelerate the
achievement" of certain academic purposes "[in] cities and towns
whose total direct service expenditures [sic] ... on schools...
[were] less than eighty-five per cent of the State average of such
expenditures."158 "For six years, starting in 1985, such towns and
cities were to be awarded one-sixth of the difference between the
eighty-five per cent figure and their actual expenditure."159 As
the parties also stipulated, both the Chapter 70 and Additional
Assistance aid were reduced, once in 1991 by four per cent and
again in 1992 by twenty percent.160 While the defendants argued
that, even if there was a constitutional duty, the Commonwealth
was meeting it, the Court disagreed:
We need not conclude that equal expenditure per pupil
is mandated or required, although it is clear that
financial disparities exist in regard to education in the
various communities. It is also clear, however, that
fiscal support, or the lack of it, has a significant
impact on the quality of education each child may
receive. Additionally, the record shows clearly that,
while the present statutory and financial schemes
155 Id.
156 See id. (explaining that since 1984 state aid has been determined through the
annual appropriations process).
157 See id. (demonstrating that when Chapter 70 formulas have been overridden by
appropriations acts, it has usually meant specific caps being set on state aid).
158 See id. at 552 (explaining in addition to annual appropriation of state aid, some
municipalities receive additional state money through the equal educational opportunity
grant program).
159 Id.
160 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552 (Mass.
1993) (noting reduction in aid).
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purport to provide equal educational opportunity in
the public schools for every child, rich or poor, the
reality is that children in the less affluent
communities (or the less affluent parts of them) are
not receiving their constitutional entitlement of
education as intended and mandated by the framers of
the Constitution. 161
The Court stated: "We find statement after statement
recounting the Commonwealth's failure to educate the children
in the plaintiffs' schools and those they typify. The
Commonwealth has not directed us to, nor have we discovered,
any statements in the record tending to show otherwise."162 The
Court cited a 1991 Report of the Committee on Distressed School
Systems and School Reform, in which the Board of Education
spoke of a "state of emergency due to grossly inadequate financial
support,"163 and further admitted that "certain classrooms simply
warehouse children at this time, with no effective education
being provided."164 Former Commissioner of Education, Harold
Reynolds, was equally explicit:
[I]n many of the communities of Massachusetts,
particularly less affluent communities such as the
ones in which the plaintiffs attend school,
Massachusetts is failing - and failing more than ever
before - to achieve [the] goal [of providing every child
with an opportunity for success in Learning]. 165
The opinion of the former Executive Director of the
Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents, Peter
Finn, stated, "[I]t is also clear that the education now offered in
many of the poor communities, including the communities in
which the plaintiffs attend school, is inadequate."166 The
condition of the schools in which the plaintiffs from the four
exemplar cities and towns attended (Brockton, Leicester, Lowell,
and Winchendon) was stipulated to be typical of the conditions of
the schools attended by plaintiffs in the other plaintiff
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 553 (Mass.
1993).
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communities. 167 Moreover, these conditions were compared to the
conditions existing in what were termed comparison communities
of Brookline, Concord, and Wellesley. 168
The stipulations and the opinions supporting them:
Outline specific deficiencies in the plaintiffs' schools,
such as: large classes; reductions in staff; inadequate
teaching of basic subjects including reading, writing,
science, social studies, mathematics, computers, and
other areas; neglected libraries; inability to attract
and retain high quality teachers; lack of teacher
training; lack of curriculum development; lack of
predictable funding; administrative reductions; and
inadequate guidance counseling.169
The contrast with the comparison districts was revealing and
obvious. Those districts were able to offer:
Significantly greater educational opportunities,
including: multi-faceted reading programs; extensive
writing programs and resources; thorough computer
instruction; active curriculum development and review
ensuring comprehensive and up-to-date curriculum;
extensive teacher training and development;
comprehensive student services; and a wide variety of
courses in visual and performing arts. In short, the
record indicates that these districts are able to
educate their Children.170
Thus, the Court concluded:
It is clear that c. 5, §2, obligates the Commonwealth to
educate all its children. The bleak portrait of the
plaintiffs' schools and those they typify painted in
large part by the defendants' own statements and
about which no lack of consensus has been shown,
167 Id. (stating "[t]he parties have stipulated that the conditions in these schools are
'typical' of the schools in the other twelve communities in which plaintiffs attend school.").
168 See id. (finding "[t]he parties have stipulated that students in the plaintiffs'
districts are offered 'significantly fewer educational opportunities and lower educational
quality than' students in the schools in the 'comparison' districts of Brookline, Concord
and Wellesley.").
169 Id.
170 Id. at 553.
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leads us to conclude that the Commonwealth has
failed to fulfill its obligation. 171
In outlining the elements of a constitutional education, the
Court recognized that what is required and appropriate for
educating one generation's children may be totally inadequate in
another.172 For example, at one time it was appropriate for
schools to have individual desks with ink wells, ink, pens and
pen nibs, but this current generation requires up-to-date
computers. Furthermore, since computer technology is
constantly changing, old computers will not suffice. Old Apple
computers are the functional equivalent of out-of-date ink wells
and pens. The Court borrowed from one of the school finance
cases it cited to describe the elements of an educated child and
said that an educated child must possess:
[A]t least the seven capabilities: (i) sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to
function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable students to
make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding
of governmental processes to enable the student to
understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-
knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts
to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training
or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child
to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably
with their counterparts in surrounding states, in
academic or in the job market.173
171 Id. at 553-54.
172 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass.
1993) (articulating "[t]he crux of the Commonwealth's duty lies in its obligation to educate
all of its children. As has been done by the courts of some of our sister States, we shall
articulate broad guidelines and assume that the Commonwealth will fulfill [sic] its duty to
remedy the constitutional violations that we have identified.").
173 See id. These capabilities were taken from Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). They parallel what Horace Mann, the first secretary
of the Board of Education said in 1849:
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The Court's remedy was to leave it to the Legislature to
develop a remedy and the judgment was as follows:
These cases are remanded. .. for entry of a judgment
declaring that the provisions of Part II, c.5, §2, of the
Massachusetts Constitution impose an enforceable
duty on the magistrates and Legislatures of this
Commonwealth to provide education in the public
schools for the children there enrolled, whether they
be rich or poor and without regard to the fiscal
capacity of the community or district in which such
children live. It shall be declared also that the
constitutional duty is not being currently fulfilled by
the Commonwealth. Additionally, while local
governments may be required, in part, to support
public schools, it is the responsibility of the
Commonwealth to take such steps as may be required
in each instance effectively to devise a plan and
sources of funds sufficient to meet the constitutional
mandate. No present statutory enactment is to be
declared unconstitutional, but the single justice, may,
in his or her discretion, retain jurisdiction to
determine whether, within a reasonable time,
appropriate legislative action has been taken.174
B. Post McDuffy Legislative Action
In regard to the application of this principle of natural law, - that is, in regard to
the extent of the education to be provided for all at the public expense, - some
difference of opinion may fairly exist under different political organizations; but,
under our republican government, it seems clear that the minimum of this
education can never be less than such as is sufficient to qualify each citizen for the
civil and social duties he will be called to discharge, - such an education as
teaches the individual the great laws of bodily health, as qualifies for the
fulfillment of parental duties, as is indispensable for the civil functions of a witness
or a juror, as is necessary for the voter in municipal and in national affairs, and,
finally, as is requisite for the faithful and conscientious discharge of all those duties
which devolve upon the inheritor of a portion of the sovereignty of this great
republic.
McDuffy, 625 N.E.2d at 555.
174 Id. at 555-56.
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Yet again, the Legislature responded to court action. 175 While
the first two times resulted in limp efforts, this time court action
had reached a culmination point, with the case actually
submitted for final resolution by the SJC.176 The Legislature
drafted the Education Reform Act (ERA),177 and the Court was
also well-aware of its development. Three days after the Court's
decision in McDuffy, the ink was dry on the Governor's signature
on this legislation. 178 Essentially, the Legislature determined
what it would cost to educate children per pupil and created a
funding formula that would bring all school districts that could
not raise that amount to what it called, "foundation," through
state aid over a seven year period.179 Once again, those who
helped McDuffy come to court had to wait until this formula was
fully implemented.180 In December 1999, as the last of the
districts were about to reach the foundation level of spending,
plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Further Relief,"181 challenging the
175 See Education Reform: Education Reform Act of 1993, Eye on Education,
http://www.eyeoneducation.tv/reform/edreform-act.html (explaining "[t]he
Massachusetts Legislature created the Act on the heels of the Supreme Judicial Court's
(SJC) 1993 ruling in McDuffy v. Robertson.").
176 See id. (commenting "the SJC ordered the Commonwealth to provide equal
educational opportunity for all students in Massachusetts.").
177 See generally MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 69 (2005) (addressing powers and duties of
Department of Education).
178 See Education Reform: First Annual Implementation Report: Educational
Summary, http://www.doe.mass.edu.edreform/lstImp/EXEC.SUMMARY.html
(specifying "[o]n June 18, 1993, the Massachusetts Education Reform Act was signed into
law.").
179 See Education Reform: Education Reform Act of 1993, Eye on Education,
http://www.eyeoneducation.tv/reform/ed.reformact.html (stating "[o]ne of the most
prominent and costly features of the Act was increased state funding for education. To
remedy inequities in funding across schools and districts, the Act established a
'foundation budget' designed to bring all schools to an adequate level of per-pupil
spending.").
180 See Education Reform: Education Reform Act of 1993, Eye on Education,
http://www.eyeoneducation.tv/reform/edreform-act.html. "In 1993, that foundation
average was $5500 per student. By the year 2000, average per-pupil spending would be
increased to the foundation level statewide, and the state contribution to education
funding would increase from 30% to 50%." Id. Counsel for the case were assisted by the
Council for Fair School Finance, which was created in the 1970s, and incorporated as a
501 (c)(3) corporation in the early 1980s to help with community support for the litigation
and a fair legislative formula. The Council consisted of a number of organizations,
including the League of Women Voters, ACLU, Greater Boston Civil Rights Coalition,
Massachusetts Teachers Association, Massachusetts Federation of Teachers, Citizens for
Public Schools, representatives from school districts, school superintendents and school
committees, and others.
181 See Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *24 (April
26, 2004). The action was filed "[b]y her father and next friend, Maurice Hancock." Id. at
*1 n.1 Massachusetts procedure [MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231A] permits certain types of
actions to be filed directly in the Supreme Judicial Court, and the original case, Webby v.
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efforts of this law to meet the constitutional requirements of
McDuffy. This time, Julie Hancock, a student at Brockton High
School, by her parents, was the lead plaintiff. 182
Plaintiffs based their challenge on the failure to implement the
McDuffy factors, and not the specifics of the ERA.183 To present
evidence, however, specific standards are needed so that the
evidence can be tested, and plaintiffs proposed that the
constitutional standards could not be less than what is required
by the ERA.184 The Attorney General's office objected to equating
the constitutional standards to the requirements of the ERA and
resisted any attempt to establish a standard which could be
measured (or to which it could be held accountable).18 5 The court
rejected the Attorney General's attempt to avoid a measurable
standard and ruled that, for the purposes of this trial, the
constitutional standard was no less than what was required by
the ERA.186 The trial began on June 12 and ended January 16,
2004, after 78 days of trial, over 100 witnesses, and over 1,000
exhibits. 187
Four of the nineteen school districts where plaintiff children
attended were analyzed in great detail during the trial.188 These
Dukakis, took advantage of this procedure. All other iterations of this actions remained in
the SJC. However, the SJC does not sit as a trier of fact, but resolves issues of law based
on findings of fact. When there are issues of fact to be resolved, the SJC refers the case to
the Superior Court for trial, or may appoint a special Master to hear evidence and make
findings in a report to the SJC. In the mid-1980s, when Webby was close to trial, a Master
had been appointed. In Hancock, unlike McDuffy, the current Attorney General (Thomas
F. Reilly) was not willing to enter into stipulations, and the SJC, rather than submitting
the case to the Superior Court for trial, specially appointed Superior Court Judge Margot
Botsford, a highly respected judge, to make findings of fact, and allowed her, in her
report, to make recommendations as to remedy, if she deemed them warranted.
182 See Hancock, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS at *1 n.1. In 1999, nineteen
plaintiff public school children from 19 different school districts "filed a motion for further
relief." Other children and their parents were from Barnstable, Belchertown, East
Bridgewater, Fitchburg, Gill-Montague Regional, Holyoke, Leicester, Lowell, Lynn,
Mashpee, Orange, Revere, Rockland, Sandwich, Springfield, Taunton, Uxbridge, and
Winchendon. Id.
183 See id. at *27 (proposing plaintiffs' evidence centered principally on "their claim
that students on the four focus districts are not receiving the level of education to which
they are entitled under the Massachusetts Constitution").
184 See generally id. (focusing factual evidence on Education Reform Act).
185 See generally id. (refuting claims of inadequate education).
186 See id. at *27 (April 26, 2004) (applying Education Reform Act
standard).exhibits.").
187 See Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *27 (April
26, 2004) (noting that "[t]rial commenced on June 12, 2003, and concluded in January of
2004. There were 114 witnesses who testified and over 1,000 exhibits.").
188 See id. at *25-26 (suggesting that "the decision was made to proceed to trial by
focusing the factual evidence on a group of districts fewer than the total, and the plaintiffs
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districts, Brockton, Lowell, Springfield, and Winchendon, were
known as the "focus districts." Three of them are large, urban
districts with significant numbers of students from racial and
ethnic minorities; the other, Winchendon, is a small rural
district.189 All four districts have substantial numbers of low
income children190
There was much progress over the first ten years of education
reform under the ERA.191 The Commonwealth developed
statewide educational standards, known as curriculum
frameworks and a testing battery, known as the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS), which up to the
time of this trial measured English Language Arts and
Mathematics.192 Students not passing this examination cannot
receive a high school diploma. Tests measuring other subjects
are being developed for similar treatment. 193 Over that time
period, $30.8 billion in state aid was provided, with an average
yearly increase of 12% per year, except for declines in 2003 and
2004.194 The Commonwealth instituted a system of teacher
certification and professional development, as well as
establishing a new office to measure school district
accountability.195 Thus, a plan was in place; the trial was about
measuring whether children were receiving the benefits of the
promise of the plan, as measured by the seven McDuffy
ultimately selected four: Brockton, Lowell, Springfield, and Winchendon (referred to
collectively hereafter as 'the focus districts' or 'the four focus districts')").
189 Id. (noting three districts are urban with many racial and ethnic minority
students).
190 See id. (explaining that "[a]ll four districts have substantial numbers of low
income children.").
191 See id. at *9 (explaining there have been impressive accomplishments in past ten
years by the Commonwealth and Department of Education).
192 See id. at *43-44 (stating that MCAS was developed in response to the Education
Reform Act and noting that it is only administered in two subjects, mathematics and
English language arts).
193 See Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *43-44
(April 26, 2004) (noting that commissioner has proposed a schedule of incorporating other
subjects into the competency determination of MCAS tests, including science and
technology and history/social science).
194 See id. at *2-3 (discussing increase in spending on education in the last ten
years).
195 See id. at *3 (noting new standards adopted for teacher certification and
professional development, as well as the creation of the new Office of Educational Quality
Assurance to increase school accountability).
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capabilities and the seven Massachusetts curriculum
frameworks. 196
The court then proceeded to outline the conditions in each of
the four focus districts, measured by the standards.197 For each
of the focus districts, the court examined "student and district
demographics, school funding since 1993, and then the
educational program from preschool through high school,
covering, among other areas, English language arts, math,
science, history, health, and the arts."198 Also examined for the
four focus districts were "[S]chool libraries, the state of
technology, and special education... as well as issues relating to
teacher qualifications and professional development."199 Lastly,
for each district, the court examined MCAS and SAT scores. 200
While there are similarities and differences among the four
focus districts, the court concluded that "not one of the districts is
adequately implementing the Massachusetts curriculum
frameworks, nor equipping its students with the capabilities
described in McDuffy. In every one of these districts, therefore,
the students are not receiving the level of education that the
Commonwealth has a constitutional duty to provide."201 These
conclusions were based on "objective measures used by the
Commonwealth to assess public school and district performance,
including: MCAS scores, dropout rates, high school graduation
rates, SAT scores, and post-graduation plans of high school
seniors."202 Comparing the four focus districts to "the state-wide
average performance of school districts in the Commonwealth, it
is clear that the districts fall below the statewide averages,
particularly over the course of the last five years."203 They "also
196 See Maura M. Pelham, Comment. Promulgating Preschool: What Constitutes a
Policy Decision Under Hancock v. Commissioner of Education, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 209,
225 (2005) (explaining that Hancock court would rely on the state's curriculum standards
to decide whether state was meeting its constitutional obligation to provide plaintiff
students with an adequate education).
197 See Hancock, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *4 (explaining the
report examined educational programs in each of the focus districts, beginning with a
review of applicable standards for evaluating these programs).
198 Id. at *5.
199 Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *5 (April 26,
2004).
200 See id. (stating that MCAS and SAT scores were examined over time and by
student group).
201 Id.
202 See id. at *6.
203 Id.
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fall below the performance of three school districts that were
used in the original McDuffy case as comparison districts:
Brookline, Concord/Carlisle, and Wellesley." 204
The Commonwealth considers that the foundation budget is
the amount necessary to implement educational standards, and
there was much evidence provided as to whether this amount
was sufficient. But the court found:
It is significant that in the school districts across
Massachusetts that are considered to be performing
well in terms of the Department's [of Education]
performance rating system, the average expenditure is
130% of the district's foundation budget, and the
statewide average expenditure is about 115-117% of
the district foundation budget.205
The "group average expenditure" in the comparison districts of
Brookline, Concord/Carlisle, and Wellesley was 161% of the
foundation budget. 20 6 "In contrast, the focus districts at present
only have funds available for school spending that are much
closer to 100% of the districts' foundation budget."20 7 Spending
by the four focus districts offers "a rough indication that the
foundation budget formula itself does not produce an adequate
level of spending, although they do not provide specific evidence
of the level of inadequacy." 208 While there was much evidence as
to the shortcomings of the foundation budget formula, the
reasons included:
[I]nadequacies in factoring in the high costs of special
education, and the absence of any review of the
foundation budget formula in light of the seven
curriculum frameworks and their demands.209
Moreover, the FY04 cuts in Chapter 70 aid as well as
specific State grants programs (for example, MCAS
remediation, class size reduction and early childhood
204 Id.
205 Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *7 (April 26,
2004).
206 Id. (noting higher average of the comparison districts).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at *8. It is significant that the foundation budget formula was created before,
and not after, the adoption of the curriculum frameworks. Therefore, the Commonwealth
had no rational idea of how much it would cost to implement the curriculum frameworks.
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education) have exacerbated the financial troubles of
many struggling school districts, including the focus
districts.210
The conclusion of the court as to the problem was about more
than needed funds:
[T]he foundation budget does not presently provide
sufficient funds to the focus districts to permit them to
implement the curriculum frameworks or generally to
meet the standards of McDuffy, and no other source of
state funding fills the gap. This is not to say, however,
that increases in the foundation budget alone will
produce an adequate educational program in these
districts. There is also a need to enhance the
managerial, administrative, and leadership capacities
of the districts.211
The court then considered several key remedies developed
during the trial, one extremely important one being the
importance of preschool education.
Years of research and national studies show, without
dispute, that for many children at risk of school
failure, including children from low income families, a
high quality preschool education program for three
and four year olds offers the best and perhaps only
realistic chance to achieve success in school thereafter;
without preschool, many children at risk (in the focus
districts and elsewhere) will not be able to benefit
from K through 12 public school education, no matter
what its quality. The four districts have very good
public school preschool programs, but only for a
limited number of the eligible children; none of them
has the resources to reach all or even nearly all the
children who need to attend.212
Finally, the court made several recommendations in the report
as to the remedy it thought appropriate. 213  Those
210 See id.
211 Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *8 (April 26,
2004).
212 Id. at *9.
213 See id. at * 9-10 (noting that report will end with recommendations to Supreme
Judicial Court concerning remedial relief).
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recommendations sought an order from the SJC to the
Commonwealth education officials to:
(1) determine the actual cost of providing to all
children in the focus districts' public schools the
opportunity to acquire the capabilities outlined in
McDuffy, which in essence means determining the cost
to implement effectively the seven curriculum
frameworks for all school children (the funding issue);
(2) determine the costs associated with enacting
measures to improve the educational leadership
capacities of the focus districts (the leadership issue);
and (3) implement whatever funding and
administrative changes result from the first two
determinations (the implementation issue).214
The court also recommended that the Commonwealth be
"provided a definite but limited period of time to accomplish
these tasks, and that the Court [Supreme Judicial Court] retain
jurisdiction to be satisfied that the remedial efforts are
progressing towards a timely, effective solution."215
C. The Doe Case
While the plaintiffs in McDuffy felt compelled to wait until the
seven years of increased funding to foundation budget status was
fully implemented before returning to court to seek further relief,
the courts were not prepared to wait so long. Within two years of
the decision in McDuffy, a case found its way to the SJC to give
the nature of the right interpretation. 216 A section of the ERA
dealt with student discipline and provided for suspension or
expulsion of students who possessed illegal substances, including
weapons. 217 In the fall of 1993, a Worcester high school student
brought a lipstick case, which contained a small blade where the
214 Id. at *10.
215 Id.
216 See Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass. 1995)
(involving a student expelled for one year for bringing a knife to school).
217 See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 71, § 37(H) (2005) (stating notwithstanding any general
or specific law to the contrary, all student handbooks shall contain a provision that any
student found on school premises in possession of a dangerous weapon may be subject to
expulsion).
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lipstick would be found.218 She intended it as a practical joke, but
found herself expelled for violation of the statute and school
district policy. 219 Among the issues winding their way to the SJC
in early 1995 was whether McDuffy gave her a fundamental right
to a public school education that was being violated by her
expulsion, her argument being that she was denied substantive
due process because expulsion was too severe a punishment to
have that right taken away.220
The lower court deemed the right to be that of an "equal
opportunity to an adequate education, a right which she may lose
by conduct seen to be detrimental to the community as a
whole."221 The SJC agreed:
We agree that McDuffy should not be construed as
holding that the Massachusetts Constitution
guarantees each individual student the fundamental
right to an education. While the court acknowledged
in McDuffy the importance of education and decided
that the Commonwealth generally has an obligation to
educate its children, the court did not hold, and we
decline to hold today, that a student's right to an
education is a "fundamental right" which would
trigger strict scrutiny analysis whenever school
officials determine, in the interest of safety, that a
student's misconduct warrants expulsion.222
If that was as far as the distinction went, not much damage
would be done to McDuffy. While most of the McDuffy opinion
focused on the legal duty or obligation to provide education, the
court recognized the importance of a constitutional right.223 In
Note 23 of McDuffy, the Court stated:
[W]e note that a constitutional right to an education is
fully consistent with the provisions of several articles
in the Declaration of Rights: the right to liberty (art.
218 See Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1091 (noting that a student brought a lipstick case to
school containing a blade).
219 See id. at 1091 (noting school policy).
220 See id. at 1095 (arguing expulsion is too harsh a punishment).
221 Id. at 1095.
222 Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass.
1995).
223 See McDuffy v. Sec'ry of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 564 (1993)
(noting that constitutional language supports the proposition that government has a duty
to provide education for the populace).
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1), the right of self-government (art. 4), the right to
elect officers and to be elected as an officer (art. 9), the
right to "obtain right and justice freely" (art. 11), the
right to be free from unreasonable searches (art. 14),
the right and duty to "require of ... lawgivers and
magistrates an exact and constant observance of' the
fundamental principles of the Constitution (art. 18),
and the right to "assemble to consult upon the
common good: give instructions to their
representatives, and to request of the legislative body,
by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances,
redress of the wrongs done them, and of the
grievances they suffer" (art. 19).224
Moreover, the Court stated that "the reality is that children in
the less affluent communities (or in the less affluent parts of
them) are not receiving their constitutional entitlement of
education as intended and mandated by the framers of the
Constitution."225
One could argue that there was a collective right, but, in light
of Doe, an individual student could forfeit that right by his or her
own actions found to affect the safety of the education
community. 226 Indeed, Doe began by saying: "[I]n fact, the court
implicitly recognized in McDuffy that educational opportunities
can be lost by students as a result of their actions."227
Distinguishing the school finance cases from cases bringing the
issue of education in other contexts, the Court continued:
The only case we have found that stands for the
proposition that education is "fundamental" in the
same sense that the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of religion and freedom of speech and the
press are considered fundamental, is State v. Rivinius
[328 N.W. 2d 220 (N.D. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1070 (1983)]. We decline to follow the reasoning of
that case. Instead, we join the courts of several other
jurisdictions in holding that education is not a
fundamental right. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. Of
Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982) ("A heartfelt
224 See id. at 527 n, 23.
225 Id. at 552.
226 See Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1095 (stating students do not have a fundamental right to
education in every situation).
227 Id. at 1096.
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recognition and endorsement of the importance of
education does not elevate a public education to a
fundamental interest warranting strict scrutiny").228
The Court suggested that the duty referred to in McDuffy as a
"public obligation to provide for general education,"229 and used
McDuffy to support the proposition that the duty to provide an
adequate public education "includes the duty to provide a safe
and secure environment in which all children can learn."230
This rationale prompted a dissent from Chief Justice Liacos,
the author of McDuffy. He could not "agree that the standard of
review to be applied to the defendants' actions need only have a
rational basis to be deemed constitutionally valid."231 He thought
it "wrong to deny that McDuffy indicated 'that the Massachusetts
Constitution guarantees each.., student the fundamental right
to an education."' 232
Clearly, since McDuffy, the Commonwealth has a duty
to provide education to the plaintiff and it is an
enforceable one [citation to McDuffy omitted]. This
duty exists to serve her interests, as well as those of
the Commonwealth. [citations omitted]. As a matter of
logic and of law, she has a correlative right to
education. 233
He asked, "Would the plaintiff, a public school student, be
eligible to seek enforcement of the Commonwealth's duty to
provide education [McDuffy] yet not have a right to that
education?" 234 Referring to the Court's citation of cases
distinguishing the right of education to other constitutional
rights, he observed, "the constitutional right to education is of no
less a magnitude in our jurisprudence than an insurer's
'fundamental right to a decision as to its liability."' 235 He further
compared the right to education to be comparable to
228 Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass.
1995).
229 Id. (citing Nicholls v. Mayor & School Comm. of Lynn, 297 Mass. 65, 68 (1937)).
230 Id. Therefore, the Court applied the rational basis test to justify the expulsion as
not a violation of substantive due process. Id.
231 Id. at 1099.
232 Id. at 1099-1100.
233 Id. at 1100.
234 Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1100 (Mass.
1995).
235 Id.
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[A]n inmate's "constitutional right" to judicial review
of the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the
findings of a prison disciplinary board [citation
omitted], a plaintiffs "fundamental right" to work
with his hands to what he regards as his best
advantage [citation omitted], the public's
"fundamental right" to read [citation omitted], and an
individual's "fundamental right" to own property
[citation omitted] .236
Chief Justice Liacos then cited Black's Law Dictionary to
correlate "duty" and "right," and then concluded that the right
generated from the duty was fundamental. 237 He first looked:
to the nature of the right and its interrelated
affirmative and enforceable duty, the separate and
prominent treatment of education in our Constitution,
the importance of education in Massachusetts since
the earliest years of the colony, our related statutes
including those on compulsory attendance, the
relationship of education to other rights of our
citizens, and the "keystone" role education serves in
the development of each individual and in the
functioning of our democracy. 238
He reviewed how school cases based on language less clear about
the nature of the right had been clear about the fundamental
right.239 He concluded:
For us to retreat from the principles stated in McDuffy
would be to deny the thrust and logic of its historical
underpinnings and would be inconsistent with the
letter of our Constitution. Such a retreat would ignore
the opinions of other State courts and put
Massachusetts into the sad condition of giving greater
status to property rights and other rights, recognized
as fundamental, which are not as fundamental to the
liberty of our free citizens and the preservation of our
236 Id. at 1100-01.
237 Id. at 1101 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 505 (6th ed. 1990)).
238 Id.
239 Id. (noting it is not unusual for states to consider education a fundamental right
and such rights have been found in constitutional language more vague than language in
Massachusetts constitution).
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constitutional democracy as is the right to a public
education.240
He characterized the nature of the right as being necessary
"fundamentally, to prepare [our children] to participate as free
citizens of a free State to meet the needs and interests of a
republican government, namely the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts." 241 Citing McDuffy, Chief Justice Liacos said,
"[I]n such a retreat I cannot join."242
The ERA set in motion a series of reforms that awaited full
funding, including the development of curriculum frameworks
and high stakes testing, known as the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS).243 In order for a
high school student to graduate at the end of the 2002-2003
school year, he or she must have obtained a particular score on
the MCAS.244 Many students failed the MCAS while Hancock
was preparing for trial and since they would be prevented from
graduating, they could not await the outcome of the Hancock
trial for legal relief.245 They filed a case and it was assigned to
the same judge who was hearing Hancock.246 They challenged
the regulations of the Board of Education that required that they
pass the tenth grade English language arts and mathematics
MCAS exams 247 and sought a preliminary injunction.248 All the
plaintiffs met all of the local school districts' requirements for
graduation except for passing the MCAS tests.
240 Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1102 (Mass.
1995).
241 Id.
242 Id. Chief Justice Liacos then turned to the proper standard of review, noting that
even though education is a fundamental right, he agreed that "school discipline, including
expulsion, may be warranted when necessary to maintain safety and security in the
schools .... Id. To him the question was "whether that compelling State interest is
served with as little infringement as possible." Id. at 1104. He would have put the
"burden on the State to demonstrate its objectives could not be achieved in a less
restrictive manner than by expulsion." Id. at 1103.
243 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603, § 30.03 (2005).
244 Id. (noting the passage rates).
245 See Student No. 9 v. Bd. of Educ., 802 N.E.2d 105, 114 n.13 (Mass. 2004) (noting
plaintiffs' frustration in waiting for the Act's implementation).
246 Id. at 107 (noting Justice Greaney wrote the opinion).
247 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603, § 30.03 (2006) (establishing MCAS requirements
for graduation).
248 See Student No. 9, 802 N.E.2d. at 107 (stating plaintiffs sought preliminary
injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing regulation).
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One argument posited was that the actions of the Board of
Education in only requiring success on the English language arts
and mathematics exams was ultra vires of the statute's
requirement that they demonstrate proficiency in all of the areas
of the curriculum frameworks, which also included science and
technology, history and social science, foreign language. 249 As a
matter of fact, the Board of Education had only developed testing
for the two subject areas tested by MCAS.250 If students were to
be held accountable, they argued, so too should the educators.
The Court rejected this argument in Student No. 9 v. Board of
Education.251 The SJC held that the Board of Education could:
[P]ermissibly exercise its discretion by the form of
pragmatic gradualism it undertook, particularly
because the fundamental subjects of English language
arts and mathematics can be considered the basic
foundational requirements with which other core
subjects can be studied and mastered. Put more
colloquially, the board could properly conclude that a
student should have competence in "reading, writing,
and arithmetic" before being tested on competence in
science, history, and other areas. 252
More relevant to the continued efficacy of McDuffy than the
legal strategy utilized by the plaintiffs in this case to achieve
relief, were the Court's statements regarding the McDuffy
requirements. 253 The plaintiffs argued that "because the
graduation requirement has not yet been based on the other core
subjects, the students educated in this State with public funds
are not being provided with a 'comprehensive education" 254 But
the Court replied:
Nothing in the McDuffy decision requires a graduation
requirement, let alone a graduation requirement
based on an assessment of multiple subjects. Simply
put, enjoining the regulation, and enjoining the
249 See id. at 113 (explaining plaintiffs' contention that the regulation's limitation of
competency requirement conflicts with several provisions of statute).
250 See id. at 107 (stating plaintiffs' conclusion that the competency determination
does not take into account other core subjects mentioned in statute).
251 802 N.E.2d 105 (Mass. 2004).
252 Id. at 114.
253 See id. at 108 n.5 (detailing Rose factors).
254 Id. at 114-15.
2006]
STJOHN'SJOURNAL OF LEGAL COAMENTARY [Vol. 21:1
defendants from requiring the plaintiffs to pass the
tenth grade English language arts and mathematics
sections of the MCAS exam as a prerequisite to
receiving a high school diploma, would undermine
educator accountability and hinder education
reform. 255
One justice expressed concern over lack of progress over the
long period of time that had passed since McDuffy was decided:
"The education of our children is no less a compelling issue than
their physical safety."256 Quoting from Brum v. Dartmouth,257 he
observed:
Local schools lie at the heart of our communities.
Each morning, parents across the Commonwealth
send their children off to school. They entrust the
schools with nothing less than the safety and well-
being of those most dear to them - their own children.
No arm of government touches more closely the core of
our families and our children than our schools. 258
255 Id. at 115.
256 Id. at 116 (Ireland, J., concurring) (noting importance of education).
257 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999).
258 See Student No. 9 v. Bd. of Educ., 802 N.E.2d 105, 116 (Mass. 2004) (Ireland, J.,
concurring). Justice Ireland summarized the status of the claims before the Court:
On the record before us today, we know that (1) the current use of the
Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) examination means that some core
subjects have been omitted from the requisite competency determination;
[footnote omitted]
(2) "the record is devoid of evidence about when the board plans fully to
implement
the Act's curriculum provisions by incorporating the remaining core subjects into
the
competency determination"; [footnote omitted] (3) "alternative routes to a high
school
diploma, theoretically available through a 'performance appeal' or an 'alternative
assessment,' as a practical matter are closed to almost all students, particularly
those
with significant learning disabilities"; [footnote omitted] (4) there is a
"considerable"
disparity in pass rates for different subgroups within the Commonwealth, as well
as
between urban and suburban schools, and (5) there is no system in place to
assess the
performance of the schools in core subjects not tested by the MCAS examination
[foot-
note omitted].
Id. at 117-18. This rationale indicates that the SJC was hopeful that, or infatuated by,
the ERA of 1993 and that this statute would solve the problem. The SJC was equating the
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While this case reached the Court at the preliminary injunction
phase of the litigation, the probabilities are that the decision
would have been the same after a full record from a full trial.
D. Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtin259
Following the 350+ page Report to the Court, the parties
briefed the case. 260 Over two dozen briefs amici curiae were
submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs' position, including one from
over 40 state legislators, one from the Massachusetts Business
Alliance for Education, and one on behalf of Jonathan Kozol,
author of Savage Inequalities, Death at an Early Age, and other
books on the plight of children growing up in poor urban
environments. 261 The case was argued on October 4, 2004 and
there were widespread predictions that the Court's decision
would favor the plaintiffs. 262 Plaintiffs, and much of the
community watching this case, were shocked by the Court's
decision on February 15, 2005, in which a plurality of the Court
refused to implement Judge Botsford's recommendations and
dismissed the case in its entirety.263
The plurality opinion in Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ.,264
written by Chief Justice Marshall, 265 accepted every finding of
fact in Judge Botsford's extensive and thorough report.266 In fact,
during oral argument, the Assistant Attorney General conceded
constitutional violations in the four focus districts, but argued
constitutional provision of the education clause with the requirement that there be a plan.
The dissents in Doe, Student No. 9 and Hancock demonstrate that the education clause
imposed constitutional standards to which all students were entitled to actually receive.
Id.
259 See THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer 1939).
260 See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1151 (Mass. 2005) (noting that
Judge Botsford's report comprised more than 300 pages).
261 See id. at 1135 (listing parties who submitted briefs for amici curiae).
262 See id. at 1172 (Greaney, J., dissenting) (commenting that "[p]ractically everyone
involved in this case assumed that the court was going to use this litigation to order the
Legislature to appropriate money to remedy the severe problems identified.").
263 See id. at 1136-37 (declining to adopt the conclusions of Judge Botsford and
disposing of the case in its entirety).
264 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005).
265 Id. at 1137. The plurality opinion was joined by Spina, J. and Cordy, J.
266 See id. at 1138 (accepting the Superior Court judge's "thoughtful and detailed"
findings of fact).
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that these districts were not typical of the other communities in
the Commonwealth. 267 Two concurring Justices Cowan and
Sosman, who would have overruled McDuffy as wrongly decided,
complemented the Judge Botsford's thoroughness in her work:
Although I criticize the treatment of the Superior
Court judge's lengthy findings and conclusions in the
Chief Justice's concurring opinion, the fault here does
not lie with the Superior Court judge, who superbly
analyzed the overwhelming body of evidence before
her. Given our opinion in McDuffy, the judge
undertook a logical analysis and produced meticulous
and scholarly findings. Unfortunately, because our
opinion in McDuffy mistakenly interjected judicial
review where it does not belong, the judge's laudable
efforts are for naught. The very level of detail and
comprehensiveness of her findings and conclusions
indicates that we have gone far astray in assuming a
role in the education debate. 268
267 See Audio tape: Transcript of Record, Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d
1134 (Mass. 2005) (SJC-09267) (Oct. 4, 2004) (on file with author). The hearing of the
argument at the Supreme Judicial Court was tape-recorded. Here is part of the exchange
between Assistant Attorney General Deirdre Roney and Chief Justice Margaret Marshall:
Marshall: "Let us assume that is fact that the Commonwealth has adopted are
in fact
perfectly reasonable standards, MCAS, for example, but here we have, as
far as I can understand it and that the Commonwealth has done that with
respect to two of the seven measures that are suggested in McDuffy, um, but
here we have four districts where it appears from the evidence, uncontested
by the Commonwealth, that in these four districts, these children are not even
meeting these standards, correct? In overwhelming numbers."
Ronev: 'There is certainly no reason to think that the children who are failing
on the
MCAS have received the capabilities mentioned in McDuffy."
Marshall: "So we have, whatever steps have been taken, these children, at
least, have failed by what the Commonwealth has said are reasonable
measures?"
Ronev: '"Yes."
Id. Conceding that MCAS was based on reasonable standards and that failing MCAS
therefore constituted constitutional violations is factually undeniable. However, the point
of the case was that there were widespread and extensive violations, as Judge Botsford's
report exhaustively demonstrated, and this degree of violations constituted a violation of
the Education Clause, as the dissent demonstrates, and as plaintiffs argued.
268 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1162 n.2 (Cowin, J., with whom Sosman, J. joins,
concurring) (praising Judge Botsford's report).
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The plurality argued that the constitutional requirements
decided in McDuffy were not violated because the
Commonwealth developed the ERA and because the facts did not
rise to the level of constitutional proportions. 269 As to the first
point, the court said:
No one, including the defendants, disputes that
serious inadequacies in public education remain. But
the Commonwealth is moving systemically to address
those deficiencies and continues to make education
reform a fiscal priority. It is significant ... that the
Commonwealth has allocated billions of dollars for
education reform since the act's passage, and that this
new and substantial financial commitment has
continued even amidst one of the worst budget crises
in decades. By creating and implementing
standardized Statewide criteria of funding and
oversight; by establishing objective competency goals
and the means to measure progress toward those
goals; by developing, and acting on, a plan to eliminate
impediments to education based on property
valuation, disability, lack of English proficiency, and
racial or ethnic status; and by directing significant
resources to schools with the most dire needs, I cannot
conclude that the Commonwealth is not meeting its
constitutional charge to "cherish the interests of...
public schools." Part II, c.5, §2.270
As to the second point, which is essentially the standard of
proof needed to prove a constitutional violation, and given the
erosion of McDuffy described in Doe and Student No. 9, the Court
now sets as the threshold standard, not only that plaintiffs show
"that many children in the focus districts are not being well
served by their school districts, they [must show] that the
defendants are acting in an arbitrary, nonresponsive, or
irrational way to meet the constitutional mandate."271 This logic
269 See id. at 1155 (concluding that Commonwealth has not neglected its
constitutional duties and thus judicial intervention is not warranted).
270 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Mass. 2005).
271 Id. at 1140. The rationale for this conclusion was:
Here, the legislative and executive branches have shown that they have
embarked
on a long-term, measurable, orderly, and comprehensive process of reform "to
provide a high quality public education to every child." G.L. c. 69, §1. They are
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leads to the conclusion that as long as there is a plan, and
financial resources committed to such plan, it does not matter
that neither the plan nor the financial support of such plan is
sufficient to deliver the educational standards required by the
Commonwealth of the students or the school districts.272
Regardless of how efficiently a school district spends its limited
resources, it does not matter that the students who do not meet
the Commonwealth's educational testing requirements do not
receive a high school diploma because they were not taught the
educational requirements. 273
And, it does not matter that if a school district did not spend
its limited resources wisely or even acted incompetently, and that
the students were not at fault, they are denied a high school
diploma for failure to meet the testing requirements and the
Commonwealth is not responsible; after all, it has a plan! The
McDuffy judgment's mandate that the provisions of Part II, c.5,
§2, of the Massachusetts Constitution impose a duty on the
magistrates and Legislatures of this Commonwealth "to provide
education in the public schools for the children there enrolled,
whether they be rich or poor and without regard to the fiscal
capacity of the community or district in which such children
live." 274 In short, do current students, who do not abdicate their
constitutional right to a public education through fault of their
own, have an enforceable right to an education under the
proceeding purposefully to implement a plan to educate all public school
children
in the Commonwealth, and the judge did not find otherwise. They have
committed
resources to carry out their plan, have done so in fiscally troubled times, and
show
every indication that they will continue to increase such resources as the
Common-
wealth's finances improve. While the plaintiffs have amply shown that many
children in the focus districts are not being well served by their school districts,
they have not shown that the defendants are acting in an arbitrary,
nonresponsive
way to meet the constitutional mandate.
Id.
272 See id. at 1152 (explaining education clause requires the Governor and
Legislature to have a plan to educate and provide resources to create and maintain said
plan, but details of policymaking are left to their discretion).
273 See id. at 1152-53 (explaining that as long as government provides substantial
and increasing financial support to public education in a way that minimizes differences
between communities, it is not violating education clause).
274 Id. at 1171.
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education clause John Adams wrote and McDuffy defined, when
it is not being delivered by their school district? How, if at all,
can they enforce it? If that right is not owed, due, and
enforceable now, 12 years after McDuffy and the ERA, when, if
ever, will it be owed, due, and enforceable?
The concurring justices believed that McDuffy was wrongly
decided, in that, aside from providing public education, there is
no enforceable duty under Part II, c.5, §2. The rationale is
because the Constitution 'declares only fundamental principles
as to the form of government and the mode in which it shall be
exercised.'... 'It is a statement of general principles and not a
specification of details.'.. . 'Its phrases are chosen to express
generic ideas, and not shades of distinction."' 275 Under this
rationale:
It is inconsistent therefore with the general structure
of our Constitution to interpret the education clause
as imposing an enforceable duty on the
Commonwealth to create and maintain the kind of
highly complex and intricate public school
establishment that the Chief Justice's concurring
opinion today would presume. Instead, the clause
should be construed as a broad directive, intended to
establish the central importance of education in the
Commonwealth and clarify that the legislative and
executive branches will be responsible for the creation
and maintenance of our public school system. [citation
omitted].. .While I do not debate that the clause
presumes the establishment of some public schools by
the legislative and executive branches, nowhere in its
text does the clause mandate any particular action on
the part of the Commonwealth, or confer any role on
the judiciary to enforce it. Public education is a
government service, the organization and finance of
which is to be determined by the executive and
legislative branches. 276
275 Cohen v. Attorney General, 259 N.E.2d 539, 543 (1971) (quoting Tax
Commissioner v. Putnam, 116 N.E. 904, 906 (Mass. 1917) and Attorney General v.
Methuen, 129 N.E. 662, 664-65 (Mass. 1921)).
276 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1159 (Mass. 2005). Justices Cowan
and Sosman reject that McDuffy could impose any duty that was enforceable by the
judiciary, but continued:
Even assuming that the education clause imposes some continuing duty on the
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This view of the education clause and McDuffy would be held to
mean only that it imposes "a duty to provide an education for all
[the Commonwealth's] children, rich and poor, in every city and
town, [citation omitted] and that the Commonwealth (not this
court) must 'devise a plan and sources of funds sufficient to meet
the constitutional mandate."' 277 This concurring opinion referred
to the education clause imposing the duty (to the extent that it
exists) on the executive and legislative branches of government
"without intrusion by the judiciary."278 Moreover, these justices
asserted:
In the twelve years since McDuffy, the Legislature
passed The Education Reform Act, and spent billions
of dollars toward realizing its goals. That is certainly
enough under our broad constitutional directive to
satisfy the mandate that the Commonwealth "cherish"
our public schools. 279
The dissenting judges understood that the shell of a plan is no
answer to rights denied. Justice Greaney wrote:
Commonwealth to support a public education system, it clearly does not
guarantee
any particular level of educational success or mandate specific programmatic
choices.
In a display of stunning judicial imagination, the McDuffy court used its
already bold
reading of the education clause to include specific programmatic "guidelines"
for the
Commonwealth to follow (the seven McDuffy "capabilities") in an attempt to
guarantee
specific curriculum areas. [citation omitted] The McDuffy court fashioned these
guidelines
from a constitutional directive that only speaks of "cherish[ing]" education,
under the
guise of constitutional "interpretation." [citation omitted] To read specific
mandates, or even guidance, into the education clause is unsupportable. The
clause no more guarantees certain educational results for the children of the
Commonwealth than it guarantees any measure of success in any other
category that the same section instructs the Legislature to promote -
"humanity," "general benevolence," "industry," "charity," "frugality," "honesty,"
"punctuality," "sincerity," "good humor," "social affections," and "general
sentiments
among the people."
Id. at 1160.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 1160.
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By any standard, the extensive findings made by the
Superior Court judge conclusively establish that the
constitutional imperative of McDuffy is not being
satisfied in the four focus districts, when they are
examined objectively against the three comparison
districts. The factual record establishes that the
schools attended by the plaintiff children in the focus
districts are not currently implementing the
Massachusetts curriculum frameworks in any
meaningful way, nor are they otherwise equipping
their students with the capabilities delineated in
McDuffy as the minimum standard by which to
measure and educated child.280
Real students were being injured as "[a]cute inadequacies exist
in the educational programs of the four focus districts in the core
subjects of English language arts, mathematics, science and
technology, and history."281 After reviewing the detailed findings
of the Report, which show a lack of quality teachers, old
textbooks and lack of funds to meet basic requirements, Justice
Greaney concluded, "the judge's report paints a 'bleak portrait of
the plaintiffs' schools' that is remarkably similar to what the
McDuffy court found eleven years ago."28 2 As to his differences
between the plurality opinion and his, he observed,
[The Chief Justice] believes ... that the
Commonwealth currently is meeting its duty to
educate the plaintiff students in the focus districts,
because of its duty to educate depends on effort and
not on results. This proposition is way off the mark.
The Chief Justice, in effect, overrules McDuffy. The
plurality result reached today both undermines
protections guaranteed to the students in the focus
districts (and other districts where the obligations of
the education clause are not being fulfilled) and
ignores principles of stare decisis.283
Justice Greaney minced no words about the Court's departure
from stare decisis:
280 Id. at 1166.
281 Id.
282 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1168 (Mass. 2005).
283 Id. at 1171.
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The McDuffy court unanimously held that children in
the Commonwealth are constitutionally entitled to an
education that is reasonably calculated to provide
them with the seven capabilities set forth in the
Supreme Court of Kentucky's guidelines in Rose v.
Council for a Better Education, Inc. [citation and
footnote omitted]. That pronouncement was reached
after intensive and scholarly examination of the
meaning and provenance of the education clause and
consideration of the principles involved. All of the
arguments now advanced by the parties were
contemplated, and decided, in McDuffy, and there was
then no misconception of the points involved.284
Justice Ireland (joined by Justice Greaney) was equally
appalled by the plurality opinion. 285 He reminded the Court of
the promise of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka:286 "[Ilt is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."287 He
continued:
Today, a plurality of the court has left the children of
the Commonwealth, who have been waiting now for
over twelve years for the promises of a constitutionally
required education this court declared in McDuffy v.
Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass.
545, 621, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993) (McDuffy), without
recourse. 288
Like Justice Greaney, Justice Ireland reminded the court of the
duty to provide the constitutionally required education and
emphasized that this duty is an "enforceable duty."289 Moreover,
citing McDuffy, he added, "[t]he citizens 'of the Commonwealth
have a correlative right to be educated,"' 290 and reminded them of
the seven McDuffy (Rose) capabilities of an educated child. He
reminded the court that "offering to aid education was
284 Id.
285 See id. at 1173 (noting discontent with plurality opinion).
286 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
287 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1173 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S.
483 (1954)).
288 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1173 (Mass. 2005).
289 See id. (commenting on government's duty).
290 Id. at 1174.
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insufficient," 29 1 and that "[t]he Legislature also is not permitted
to shift its duty to local governments." 292 Justice Ireland added
that, in his opinion, "McDuffy did not envision that this
constitutional duty would be subject to the vagaries of budget
issues."293 Because Justice Greaney's dissent scrutinized Justice
Cowan's views, Justice Ireland took aim at the reasoning of the
plurality opinion. Comparing the language used by the Chief
Justice in the plurality opinion, "painfully slow," with language
used by the Supreme Court in Brown, "with all deliberate
speed,"294 Justice Ireland concluded that, "the Chief Justice's
assessment that this painfully slow progress does not violate the
education clause implicitly overrules the holding of McDuffy."295
He agreed with Judge Botsford, who concluded "that the children
of the Commonwealth are not receiving their constitutionally
required education.296 He also agreed that Judge Botsford's
findings were a "model of precision, comprehensiveness, and
meticulous attention to detail."297 After his own review of several
of the findings, Justice Ireland emphasized some of the funding
deficiencies found by Judge Botsford from the evidence: "The
judge considered evidence concerning the foundation budget
formula and found that even the defendants' own witnesses were
not able to say that the foundation budget is adequate to provide
the education called for by McDuffy, in terms of the curriculum
frameworks." 298 He addressed the separation of powers argument
advanced by the Commonwealth to argue that the Court didn't
have the power to order a remedy by quoting Judge Botsford's
findings:
[T]he difficulty with the defendants' solution is that
the system they depend on to improve the capacities of
the schools and districts is not currently adequate to
do the job. Since approximately 1980, the
department's staff has been reduced by more than half
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
295 Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1174 (Mass. 2005).
296 See id. at 1175 (noting Chief Justice's statement that the "goals of education
reform adopted since McDuffy [clearly have not] been fully achieved").
297 Id.
298 Id. at 1176.
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- from over 1,000 employees to a number less than
400. At the same time, under the [Education Reform
Act], the department's responsibilities have multiplied
and intensified in critical ways. In terms of reviewing
school district performance, in the three years since
the department developed the school accountability
system, it has been able to conduct School panel
reviews in only twelve to fourteen schools each year,
although the annual pool of schools demonstrating
'low' or 'critically low' performance is in the
hundreds. 299
Justice Ireland concluded his dissent by reminding the court of
the Supreme Court decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Services,300 where a father abused his child,
rendering him permanently injured. 301 He sued the state's
Department of Social Services for not protecting him, arguing
that the failure to protect him denied him liberty under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Justice Ireland related that the Supreme
Court "expressed its 'natural sympathy' for Joshua, but declined
to hold that the due process clause offered him any relief."302
Justice Blackmun dissented, lamenting 'Poor Joshua!' and
stated that given a choice, he would adopt a 'sympathetic'
reading [of the due process clause], one which comports with
dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion
need not be exiled form the province of judging."303 Justice
Ireland concluded, "Today the Chief Justice states that she has
sympathy for the 'sharp disparities in the educational
opportunities, and the performance, of some' children of the
Commonwealth and states that it is too late for many
students."304 In Justice Ireland's words, he was "disappointed
and saddened that, instead of acting to assist our children, five
299 Id. at 1177.
300 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
301 Id. at 191 (noting petitioner was "beaten and permanently injured by his father").
302 See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1178 (Mass. 2005).
303 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (noting plaintiffs deserve an opportunity to have
facts considered).
304 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1178 (expressing disappointment and sadness in the
majority decision).
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Justices leave them without recourse like 'Poor Joshua.' Our
children deserve better."305
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE MASSACHUSETTS
CONSTITUTION AND THE HANCOCK DECISION
An application of the Massachusetts Equal Protection
provisions begins with reviewing Equal Protection under the U.S.
Constitution. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,306 the Supreme Court has generally
recognized three separate tiers of analysis, each beginning with
an inquiry into what type of right or classification the law in
question is alleged to infringe. 307 The "tiers of scrutiny" break
down into "strict scrutiny,"308 an application which covers
305 Id. Nor did the Court refer to Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v New York, 801
N.E.2d 326, 332 (2003), where the New York Court of Appeals not only held educational
requirements to a high standard [similar to the Rose or McDuffv standards], but, as was
requested in Hancock, ordered that a study be implemented to determine the cost of
implementing these educational requirements. Id. The court was analyzing whether
schoolchildren got a meaningful high school education. See id. Nor did the Court in
Hancock look to see how other state supreme courts dealt with the issue of remedy for the
denial of an adequate or equal education in those states. Hancock, 822 N.E.2d.1134
passim. The court was only noting McDuffy. See id.
306 U.S. CONST.. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
307 See CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND
RECONSTRUCTION 662-63 (2nd ed. 2003).
308 See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.... It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
than are most other types of legislation .... Nor need we enquire whether
similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular
religious... or national ... or racial minorities ... whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. The Court noted that laws that curtail civil rights are immediately suspect. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The court explained the heavy
burden on the state. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
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"suspect classifications" and "fundamental rights;" "middle tier
scrutiny," which implicates gender classifications; 309 and
"rational basis scrutiny,"310 which applies to all other
government action that does not trigger a heightened category. 311
While textually the Equal Protection specifications under the
Massachusetts Constitution may not resemble the Fourteenth
Amendment, "the Massachusetts courts have traditionally
applied the federal equal protection framework when addressing
claims raised under the state constitution."312 Accordingly,
Massachusetts' courts, like the federal courts, apply the strict
scrutiny test to cases involving a fundamental right or a suspect
class, 31 3 and simple rational basis scrutiny to most other
actions. 31 4 Further, the respective legal tests that effectuate the
rational basis and strict scrutiny standards under the
Declaration of Rights mirror their federal counterparts - strict
scrutiny mandating a compelling state interest and rational basis
requiring plaintiff show illegitimate interest or irrational
means.
3 15
While the Massachusetts and federal courts agree on several
points of their particular Equal Protection applications, there are
309 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (noting "[t]o withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
government objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.").
310 See New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979)
(concluding, after applying rational basis scrutiny, that it was not a Fourteenth
Amendment violation for Transit Authority to refuse to hire methadone users for safety
reasons).
311 See William L. Campbell, Moving Against the Tide: An Analysis of Home School
Regulation in Alabama, 52 ALA. L. REV. 649, 654-55 (2001) (explaining different levels of
scrutiny).
312 See Lawrence Friedman, Ordinary and Enhanced Rational Basis Review in the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: A Preliminary Investigation, 69 ALB. L. REV. 415,
417 n. 7 (citing Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 488 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Mass. 1986), for the
proposition that "[flor purposes of equal protection analysis, [the] standard of review
under the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is the same as
under the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 488 N.E.2d
757, 759 (1986) (holding that absent a suspect class or fundamental right, a rational basis
test should be used).
313 See Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 138 n.7 (Mass. 1980) (noting that
Massachusetts amended its constitution in 1976 to include race, color, creed, or national
origin).
314 See Dickerson, 488 N.E.2d at 759 (commenting that if a law is rationally related to
legitimate government purpose it is valid).
315 See Murphy v. Department of Corrections, 711 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1999) (noting
standard of review for equal protection claims are nearly identical to Federal
Constitution).
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two major differences between them.316 The first departure exists
in the respective courts' treatment of the gender classification. 317
Codified in 1976, the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) provides, "Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin."318
By including gender-based classifications under the reach of
strict scrutiny, the SJC held, '[a] statutory classification based on
sex is subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the State ERA and
will be upheld only if a compelling interest justifies the
classification and if the impact of the classification is limited as
narrowly as possible consistent with its proper purpose."319 Thus
instead of applying middle tier or intermediate scrutiny to
gender cases, Massachusetts' courts treat gender-based
classifications with the same level of scrutiny as race-based
classifications.
The other major difference between the federal and
Commonwealth Equal Protection analyses is the area of
"enhanced rational basis scrutiny."320 Although it has drawn
much attention in the legal community since the 2003 SJC
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,3 21 the
enhanced rational basis scrutiny has existed in the
Commonwealth since the beginning of the 20th century.3 22 In
order to evoke an application of enhanced rational basis scrutiny
rather than the ordinary rational basis test, "the government
action must implicate or restrict an interest that the court deems
important, but that does not rise to the level of a fundamental
316 See Dickerson, 488 N.E.2d at 759 (explaining for all purposes state equal
protection claims are treated just like Fourteenth Amendment claims).
317 See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Equal Protection: Its Diverse Guises and
Effects, 66 ALB. L. REV. 599, 626- 28 (2003) (comparing the levels of scrutiny
Massachusetts and federal courts use).
318 MASS. CONST. art. 1 (1976) (stating "[a]ll people are born free and equal and have
certain natural, essential and unalienable rights.").
319 See Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Mass. 1980) (concluding the state
does have a compelling interest under strict scrutiny).
320 Compare Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.432, 432 (1985) (employing
normal rational basis review), with Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d, 941,
960 (2003) (noting that the court uses a modified rational basis standard).
321 798 N.E.2d at 959-60 (commenting Massachusetts Constitution protects
individual rights more then the Federal Constitution).
322 See id. at 960 (explaining modified rational basis).
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personal interest."323 The enhanced test thus shifts the focus
from a "conceivable" basis for government action to a "real and
demonstrable connection." 32 4
While the Hancock court did not proceed to an Equal
Protection analysis of the ERA, the question is whether that
legislation would have overcome any tier of scrutiny.
V. To DIE UPON A KiSS325
To what extent there is anything left of McDuffy, and to what
extent this Court has been faithful to Marbury v. Madison326 and
its own precedent for courts to give remedies to wrongs, is for
you, dear reader, to decide. 327 The Hancock plurality says yes,
323 See Friedman, supra note 312 (forthcoming 2006); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d
at 960 n. 20 (noting "[s]tatutes have failed rational basis review even in circumstances
where no fundamental right or 'suspect' classification is implicated.").
324 See Friedman, supra note 312 (forthcoming 2006); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d
at 960 n. 20 (noting "[niot every asserted rational relationship is a 'conceivable' one, and
rationality review is not 'toothless."').
325 Shakespeare, Othello, http://shakespeare.about.comlibrary/blothello5_2.htm
(quoting Othello).
326 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (establishing judicial review).
327 It is a myth to state that courts, even those where the justices are not elected, but
are appointed, are not subject to the pressures of public opinion. To be sure, there have
been prestigious courts and prestigious justices who were courageous in the face of
extreme adverse public opinion. But, a study of history shows that this is the exception to
the rule that courage and wisdom do not come automatically with judicial robes. Often
times, that pressure survives current politicians. Two cases decided prior to Hancock
resulted in steady criticism of the SJC. The SJC decided Bates v. Director of Office of
Campaign and Political Finance. 763 N.E.2d 6, 6 (2002) (explaining how to interpret a
statute). This case is commonly known as the Clean Elections Law case, as the voters
used the constitutional initiative process to provide state funding to political candidates
who agreed not to spend beyond a certain amount on political campaigns. See MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 55A, § 1 (noting it was repealed). The SJC upheld this law and told the
Legislature to implement the law or repeal it, the response of the leadership of the House
of Representatives was swift and pointed. In an article in the Boston Globe, the Speaker
of the House, Thomas Finneran, threatened to change the judicial appointment system to
an elective system. He said, "[I]f the court's going to insert itself into things like this...
you may as well put everything on the ballot .... Elections are cleansing agents for when
we make mistake." See also Rick Klein, Finneran Suggests Election of Judges, BOSTON
GLOBE, February 8, 2002, at Al. Klein went on to say that "[t]here is no cleansing
mechanism against judges." [Currently, Massachusetts judges are appointed by the
Governor and may serve until they reach the age of 70.]. Furthermore, there is concern
about judges becoming involved in political decision making. Rick Klein Risks Lurk In
SJC'S Clash With Legislature Some See Justices Overstepping Bounds, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 11, 2002, at B1.
Ever since the decision by the Court in Goodridge, it has been attacked by politicians at
the local, state, and national level. Attacks on the SJC for substituting their values for the
values of heterosexual marriage have been constant ever since the decision in 2003.
Recently, at a function of the Federalist Society in Washington, D.C. Massachusetts
Governor Mitt Romney, who has attacked the Court for its decision in Goodridge many
times, was quoted by the Boston Globe as saying, "If a judge substitutes his or her values
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the dissent says McDuffy was overruled, and the concurring
opinion agrees with the dissent, but also maintains that McDuffy
was initially wrongly decided. 328 Everyone agrees that the
children in the four focus districts did not get the education
promised to them, and it is clear that these children, in the
public schools of the Commonwealth at this moment in time are
not getting any remedy from this Court. Whether these
children's children and future generations of students will get
McDuffy's promises will be decided in the future. This Court's
treatment of John Adams' value of education and its
interpretation of the Constitution in McDuffy, is perhaps best
described by Shakespeare:
Put out the light, and then put out the light:
If I quench thee, thou flaming minister,
I can again thy former light restore,
Should I repent me: but once put out thy light,
Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature,
I know not where is that Promethean heat
That can thy light relume.
When I have pluck'd thy rose,
I cannot give it vital growth again,
Its needs must wither; - I'll smell it on the tree. -
Kissing her
Ah balmy breath, that dost almost persuade
Justice to break her sword! One more, one more.
Be thus when thou art dead, and I will kill thee,
And love thee after. One more, and that's the last:
So sweet was ne'er so fatal. It must weep,
But they are cruel tears: this sorrow's heavenly;
It strikes when it doth love. 329
for those values that were placed in the constitution, they do so at great peril to the
culture of our entire land." Scott Helman, Romney Rips SJC's on Values, BOSTON GLOBE,
November 11, 2005, at Al. The author also noted that the comment by Romney resulted
in over 500 lawyers applauding. See id.
328 Hancock v. Comm'r Educ, 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1139, 1159-60 (2005) (exploring
significance of McDuffy).
329 Shakespeare, Othello, http://shakespeare.about.com/librarylblothello-5 2.htm
(quoting Othello in Act V, Scene II).
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